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In this thesis, I estimate a Quadratic Almost Ideal Demand System using Swiss household
expenditure data from 2006-2017. To control for the censored budget share variable
of alcohol, I implemented a two-step Heckman-type model for consistent estimation
of the demand system. Furthermore, I computed Stone-Lewbel-like prices to increase
price variation, and controlled for expenditure endogeneity with an augmented regression
approach. For the estimation, I partitioned the sample into consumers and abstainers of
alcohol and enhanced each demand systems with the appropriate inverse Mills ratio. The
two models were then estimated with an iterated linear least squares estimator. Firstly,
I find that income elasticities are in the interval of ca. 0.3 (Food) to 1.7 (Recreation).
Secondly, uncompensated own-price elasticities range from -1.3 (Others) to -0.2 (Alcohol).
All own-price elasticities are of a slightly lower magnitude in the compensated case due
to the income effect and the fact that all commodity groups are normal goods. Lastly,
theoretical restrictions are empirically tested. The results suggest that homogeneity and
symmetry are rejected, while approximately one-third of households in the sample satisfy
negativity.
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1 Introduction
Applied demand analysis has been subject to extensive research throughout history. It
is essential for two main reasons. Firstly, it can serve as a tool to learn about price and
income effects for individuals (i.e. to quantify these effects). This is obviously of great
interest for the economist and the policymaker. Finding quantifiable answers to questions
such as “How do households respond to an increase in alcohol prices?” or “What is the
effect of a carbon tax on the consumer demand for fossil fuels?” allows the policymaker to
make optimal decisions. Furthermore, it can be the groundwork for many other types of
analyses in realms like welfare analysis (e.g. welfare effects of changes in the value-added
tax system) or competition analysis (e.g. merger simulations and analysis of market power
abuse by dominant firms). Secondly, it allows economists to test the empirical validity of
their theoretical models. Hence, questions are addressed such as “What functional form
should a demand function have?” and “In what way should prices and incomes be allowed
to influence demand?” (Brown and Deaton, 1972). It seems most difficult to find answers
to the latter type of questions, and there has thus been a vivid, ongoing scientific debate
centered around that matter. Given the considerable interest in applied demand analysis,
it is not surprising that this domain is fairly old. In fact, it has already been investigated
before Adam Smith (1776) laid the foundation of classical economics in “The Wealth of
Nations”.
Given its importance, there has also been empirical research on consumer demand in
Switzerland. While most studies focused on the demand for single goods (e.g. Kilchling
et al., 2009; Boes et al., 2015; Abdulai, 2003), only a few studies estimated complete
demand systems. Abdulai (2002) adopted the Quadratic Almost Ideal Demand System
(QUAIDS) to study the demand for food with Swiss household expenditure data. He
defined several disaggregated commodity groups for food items and one broad composite
commodity consisting of non-food items. According to this procedure, consumers are
assumed to allocate their budget to one of the food categories or to non-food items. His
estimated uncompensated own-price elasticities for the food categories are mostly below
one, while “Non-Food Items” is overall the most price-elastic commodity group. It is
worthwhile to mention that in this study, zero expenditure was neither controlled for nor
mentioned. It seems likely that there are some categories where a significant fraction
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of households do not spend money on (for instance, vegetarian households that do not
purchase fish and meat). Not controlling for this with a censored regression approach
most probably gives biased results.
Aepli (2014a) devoted his PhD-thesis to the study of consumer demand in Switzerland.
In particular, he published two essays analysing demand for food and alcoholic beverages
using complete demand systems. In Chapter III, he implemented a three-stage budgeting
QUAIDS to study the demand for meat and dairy products. He found that most of
the product groups are necessary goods and concluded that most meat and milk-based
commodity groups are substitutes.
Aepli (2014b), which was featured as Chapter IV in Aepli (2014a), estimated a two-stage
QUAIDS to analyse the demand for alcoholic beverages. He first estimated a QUAIDS
to determine the demand for broad commodity groups. Subsequently, he examined the
demand for alcohol in more detail by employing another QUAIDS in a second step. The
main finding of this study is that moderate and heavy drinkers are less price-sensitive
with respect to wine and beer than light drinking households. However, there seems to be
no difference when considering spirits. Both Aepli (2014a, Chapter III) and Aepli (2014b)
featured a two-step Heckman-type estimation procedure to control for zero consumption
of some alcohol categories.
In this thesis, I apply the QUAIDS model to Swiss household expenditure data from
2006 to 2017. The goal of the thesis is to learn about household’s demand reaction to
changes in consumer prices and income. In particular, the goal is to estimate own- and
cross-price as well as income elasticities of households, which can serve as a foundation
for policymakers’ decisions. Furthermore, I test and discuss the empirical validity of
the theoretical restrictions homogeneity, symmetry and negativity.1 Generally, I adopt a
1Homogeneity is the property that demand functions are homogeneous of degree zero in prices and
income. Hence, a proportional change in prices and income does not affect the demand. Symmetry
means that the substitution matrix (Slutsky matrix) with the price derivatives of compensated demands
as its elements is symmetric. Equivalently, the change in the compensated demand for good i after a
marginal price change of good j must be equal to the change in the compensated demand for good j after
a marginal price increase of good i. By Shephard’s lemma, the substitution matrix is equal to the Hessian
of the expenditure function, and, therefore, the symmetry property follows from Young’s theorem. The
negativity condition states that the substitution matrix is negative semidefinite. It results from the fact
that the Hessian of a concave function (in this case the expenditure function, which is concave in prices)
must be negative semidefinite. Negativity implies that all diagonal elements of the Slutsky matrix are
non-positive, i.e. that the compensated demand for a specific good decreases or remains unchanged as its
price rises. The fourth condition is adding-up (sometimes also referred to as additivity or aggregation
restriction), and states that budget shares must add up to one, which results directly from the budget
constraint. Similarly, a reallocation of the budget due to price and income changes must continue to
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similar empirical approach as Aepli (2014b). Other than Aepli (2014b), I only estimate
the QUAIDS for broad commodity groups (the first stage of his approach). One main
difference is that I will use Stone-Lewbel-like household-specific price indices derived from
national price index data. To my knowledge, this has not been done before in the context
of QUAIDS estimation with Swiss data. The strength of this approach is that one can
estimate price coefficients with superior precision (see, as a comparison, Table S12 in
“Additional file 1” of Aepli, 2014b).2 Moreover, there are two main challenges that I will
tackle in the analysis. Firstly, there is a significant fraction of households that do not
report any expenditure on alcohol. As I argue, this is due to a selection decision made by
households. Estimating the demand system without controlling for this sample selection
would lead to biased results. This thesis adopts a two-stage approach to correct this bias.
The second challenge is expenditure endogeneity, which I address with instrument variable
technique.
The thesis is structured as follows. Section 2 reviews the historical background of applied
demand analysis and the most important demand systems. Section 3 describes the data
used in this thesis, while Section 4 introduces the AIDS model and the methodological
extensions applied in this thesis. In Section 5, I present the empirical results of the
analysis, which are then discussed in Section 6. Section 7 concludes.
exhaust total income. Since this restriction is mechanically satisfied in the QUAIDS model, I do not
further investigate it. For a more rigorous discussion of these conditions and their relevance in applied
demand analysis, see, among others, Brown and Deaton (1972).




The first documented predecessor of empirical demand analysis dates back to the late 17th
century when Davenant (1699) published an article analysing the balance of trade. Part of
this work was a numerical tabulation of different defects in crop harvest and price changes.
He wrote: “’Tis observ’d, That but 1/10 defect in the Harvest [of wheat] may raise the
Price 3/10, [...]”, which shows the early interest in the (over-proportional) relationship
between quantities and prices. More rigorous studies have been conducted and theories
developed in subsequent years, mostly attempting to disentangle the effects of supply
and demand on prices (see for instance Smith (1776), Book I, Chapter VII). A critical
contribution of Adam Smith was his suggestion of assuming the demand curve to be
downward sloping. However, the development of the empirical analysis of demand curves
stagnated in the 18th and 19th centuries. The main reason for this is that correlation
and regression techniques were not yet developed until the late 19th century (Brown and
Deaton, 1972).
Despite this stagnation, Ernst Engel presented an empirical finding in 1857, which
later came to be known as Engel’s law (Perthel, 1975). He analysed and described the
relationship between food share of household expenditure and income. His finding was
a negative relationship between those variables, implying that the income elasticity of
households for food is below unity. This observation was confirmed in numerous studies
(hence the term Engel’s law) and has proven to be highly relevant. Nowadays, many
countries determine poverty lines in terms of food share of household expenditure (Anker,
2011).
In the early 20th century, regression methodology became an attractive tool to fit demand
equations. Benini (1907), for instance, estimated a multiple regression model to describe
the demand for coffee using the price of coffee and the price of sugar as explanatory
variables. These single-equation models have been subject to early econometric research
to describe demand. In many practical settings, the estimation of a set of single-equation
models was considered satisfactory. However, in the fifties, economists like Richard Stone
began to centre their research around the estimation of complete demand systems, which
are more attractive from a theoretical point of view (Brown and Deaton, 1972).
In 1954, Stone presented the Linear Expenditure System, which was the first full demand
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system, and applied it to British household expenditure data from 1920 to 1938. In
the following decades, numerous other demand systems have been developed, the most
notable of which were the Rotterdam model developed by Theil (1965) and Barten (1968),
as well as Deaton and Muellbauer (1980)’s Almost Ideal Demand System (AIDS). All
these three demand systems have been extensively studied and applied, and each has its
strengths and weaknesses. The most widely used, however, is arguably the AIDS model
thanks to some desirable properties. The AIDS model has been extended by Banks et al.
(1997), who suggested adding a term to the model that allows for quadratic income effects.
Their extension came to be known as the Quadratic Almost Ideal Demand System and is
well-established in practice nowadays.
Since the 1990s, there has been a change in the data used for demand analysis (Heien and
Wessells, 1990). While earlier studies estimated empirical models with time-series data,
increased availability of micro-data shifted demand analysis towards using cross-sectional
or panel data. The latter type of data is preferable as it avoids the problem of aggregation
over consumers and circumvents the endogeneity issue of price variables at the aggregate
level. In addition, the statistical richness of micro-data allows for more precise estimates.
2.1 Linear Expenditure System
The Linear Expenditure System (LES) was derived by Stone (1954). He proceeded by
setting up a linear relationship between expenditure on good i on the left-hand side of the
equations and income and prices on the right-hand side of the expenditure system. The
system is set up in a way to assume expenditure to be decomposable into two linearly
separable parts. The first part represents a fixed amount of minimum outlay on each good
i, while the second part can be interpreted as a super-numerary expenditure split in fixed
proportions between all goods.
The model imposes adding-up, homogeneity and symmetry by construction and implicitly
assumes consumers’ utilities to be represented by a Stone-Geary utility function (see
Geary, 1950). However, the linear functional form of the LES can be very restrictive
and entail some undesirable properties (Brown and Deaton, 1972). In particular, inferior
goods are not possible, and all price-elastic goods are substitutes with all price-inelastic
goods. Another caveat is that it is only linear conditional on a set of parameters, and it
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cannot be estimated with standard OLS.
Despite these drawbacks, researchers used the model widely in applied demand analysis.
Stone (1954) initially applied the model to British data from 1920 to 1938 and continued
to use the model extensively afterwards. Parks (1969) estimated the LES and different
specifications of it with Swedish data from 1861 to 1955. He further compared its
performance with other demand systems such as the indirect addilog system and the
Rotterdam model. His findings were somewhat ambiguous: For some criteria, the
Rotterdam model seemed to outperform the others, while the LES and the indirect addilog
system seemed to give superior predictions for some commodities. Pollak and Wales (1969)
applied the LES model to US data from 1929 to 1965 and compared the pre- and postwar
periods. Later, Lluch (1973) enhanced the LES with another parameter representing
the ratio of the subjective discount rate to the interest rate. This so-called Extended
Linear Expenditure System (ELES) allows studying consumption-savings decisions of
households. After the introduction of the AIDS model, the LES has lost some of its
appeal. However, there are some more recent studies employing the ELES to study the
relationship mentioned above (see, for instance, Cao, 2013).
2.2 Rotterdam Model
In contrast to the LES, the Rotterdam model starts by decomposing infinitesimal changes
in demand into marginal changes in prices and wealth (Theil, 1965). In a second step, Theil
parametrised this differential equation and replaced infinitesimal changes with their finite
counterparts. The result was a demand system that allows to impose or test the adding-up,
homogeneity and symmetry restrictions. Barten and Geyskens (1975) showed how one
could impose negativity using the Cholesky decomposition of the Slutsky substitution
matrix. They further estimated the implied non-linear combination of parameters using
maximum likelihood methodology. Despite this subsequent research effort, the Rotterdam
model has continuously been criticised for not being derived from a well-behaved utility
function. Barten (1969) argued that it instead should be regarded as the first term of
a Taylor expansion of any arbitrary demand function. Still, the system only satisfies
integrability locally. Integrability is an additional restriction that must be satisfied by
first difference demand equations in order to be compliant with demand theory (Brown
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and Deaton, 1972). Global imposition of this condition would imply constant budget
shares (Cobb-Douglas case). Such an extreme restriction is a severe limitation, and Brown
and Deaton (1972) argued that, therefore, “the system can hardly be called a system of
demand functions”.
The Rotterdam model has been used a lot since its development, although it could never
reach the popularity of the LES and the AIDS (Clements and Gao, 2015). Its main
appeal lies in its unconventional approach to demand analysis, which for the first time
allowed to test the theory of the utility-maximising consumer rigorously. Furthermore, it
is notable that this workhorse of demand analysis has been developed in neither of the
two Cambridges, which were arguably global leaders in economic research by that time.
Instead, it was developed in Rotterdam – the second largest city in a minor European
country still suffering from World War II.
Empirical results of the Rotterdam model generally show good uniformity, although some
results seem to contradict each other (Brown and Deaton, 1972). Some studies (e.g. Barten,
1967) found that symmetry and homogeneity cannot be rejected, while others (e.g. Barten,
1969) came to opposite conclusions. More recent studies are, for instance, Tonsor et al.
(2010), who used the Rotterdam model to estimate meat demand in the USA. They found
that the meat categories beef, pork and poultry exhibit price-inelastic demand. Other
recent studies include Barnett and Seck (2008), where the relative performance of the
Rotterdam model to the AIDS model has been evaluated using Monte Carlo simulation.
They found that, in general, the fully non-linear AIDS outperforms the Rotterdam model,
while the latter seems to give more satisfactory results than the linearised version of the
AIDS model (see Section 4.1).
2.3 Almost Ideal Demand System
The Almost Ideal Demand System has been developed by Deaton and Muellbauer (1980)
and became arguably the most popular model in applied demand analysis (Clements and
Gao, 2015). In contrast to the Rotterdam model, which assumes an arbitrary preference
ordering, it is derived from a specific class of preferences called “price invariant generalized
logarithmic” preferences (PIGLOG). These preferences allow for exact aggregation over
consumers implying that market demands can be regarded as the outcome of a single
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rational and representative consumer (Deaton and Muellbauer, 1980). From these PIGLOG
preferences, budget share equations can be derived with some desirable properties, which
I discuss in greater detail in Section 4.1. The main drawback of the AIDS model is that it
does not allow for testing or imposing the Slutsky negativity condition, a problem that
has largely remained unsolved in applied demand analysis.3 Moreover, it is only linear
in parameters conditional on the income term of the budget share equations. Hence, it
either has to be approximated linearly or estimated with non-linear estimation techniques.
Another approach is to estimate the demand system iteratively, which is possible thanks
to its conditional linearity.
The AIDS model and its variants have experienced widespread adoption. The model is used
for two main types of demand analysis. Firstly, it is applied to study the demand for broad
commodity groups as done in this thesis. And secondly, competition economists implement
it to study product differentiation, such as brand differentiation on a disaggregated level
(see, among others, Baltas, 2002). The AIDS model has proven to capture substitution
patterns reasonably well compared to, for instance, the LES or discrete choice models.
This property is especially interesting for welfare analysis and studies in the field of
competition and antitrust analysis (Davis and Garcés, 2010, Chapter 9).
3There have been attempts to impose Slutsky negativity locally in the context of AIDS models. I
discuss this further in Section 5.5.
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3 Data
This section presents the data used in this thesis. Section 3.1 describes the household
expenditure data set, while Section 3.2 introduces the price data used. Finally, I explain
how variation of the price data was increased in Section 3.3.
3.1 Household Budget Survey
The main data set used in this thesis is provided by the Federal Statistical Office
of Switzerland (FSO). The data is gathered in the Household Budget Survey (HBS).
Approximately 250 households are randomly selected each month to take part in this
survey. The participating households then have to keep track of their income and
expenditure in a very detailed manner for one month. In addition to that, they have to
report socio-demographic information, including household size, the composition of the
household, and more (BFS, 2013).
One data set consists of five files with different data types and represents a period of three
years. The first file contains general information about the households, such as households’
identification numbers, income, transfers, expenditure on aggregate commodity groups
and savings. Furthermore, it provides details about household size, the composition of
the household, region and year. The second file contains detailed data about consumption
expenditure at four different levels of aggregation. The third file reports quantities
purchased for food, alcohol and fuel, measured in kilograms for food and litres for liquids.
The fourth file contains information about durable goods that the households possess.
Lastly, the fifth file provides information about individuals living in the household. In this
thesis, I use four of these data sets, each of which consists of data for three consecutive
years. The four data sets provided by the FSO cover the years 2006-2017, inclusive. As a
result, the total number of observations is equal to 38’975.
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Table 3.1: Descriptive statistics of the key variables in the sample.
Mean SD Min Max
Labor income 7’794 5’868 0 30’697
Gross income 9’849 4’947 1’912 30’772
Disposable income 7’095 3’528 1’183 21’085
Total expenditure 5’620 2’819 297 75’774
Total consumption expenditure 3’955 2’184 200 73’255
Number of household members 2.40 1.25 1 14
Number of adults 1.67 1.02 0 7
Number of children 0.48 0.86 0 8
Number of pensioners 0.26 0.58 0 3
Number of earners 1.33 0.88 0 6
Woman reference person 0.30 0.46 0 1
N 34’295
Table 3.1 gives an overview of some key economic and socio-demographic variables of
the households. I removed households from the lowest and highest percentile of the
income distribution and the ones with a reference person older than 75 years from the
sample. Hence, the sample becomes more homogeneous, which circumvents potential
biases introduced by outliers in the subsequent analysis. Of the remaining observation,
the average Labor income is approximately 7’800 Swiss francs (CHF) per month4, Gross
income (including social and other transfers, not including capital income) is on average
9’850 CHF/month. The mean of Disposable income (after taxes and other mandatory
transfers) equals approximately 7’100 CHF/month. Households spend on average 5’620
CHF/month, 3’950 CHF/month of which is on the commodity groups considered in the
analysis of this thesis. On average, a household consists of 2.4 members, 1.67 adults, 0.48
children and 0.26 pensioners. The mean number of earners per household is 1.33, and for
30 % of the households, a woman is the reference person.
41 CHF = 9.14 NOK (https://www.norges-bank.no/en/topics/Statistics/exchange_rates. Accessed
14.05.2021).
3.1 Household Budget Survey 11
Table 3.2: Descriptive statistics of households’ expenditure shares.
Mean Median SD Min Max Share of zeros
Food and non-alcoholic beverages 0.191 0.177 0.0970 0 0.843 0.0036
Alcoholic beverages 0.017 0.004 0.0332 0 0.575 0.4682
Clothing 0.057 0.042 0.0584 0 0.542 0.1986
Housing and energy 0.071 0.058 0.0515 0 0.740 0.0009
Restaurants and accommodation 0.142 0.126 0.0989 0 0.895 0.0471
Transport 0.226 0.205 0.1117 0 0.924 0.0005
Recreation and leisure 0.149 0.129 0.0957 0 0.878 0.0036
Other goods and services 0.147 0.127 0.1021 0 0.900 0.0090
N 34’295
For this study, only non-durable goods have been considered. The reason for this is the
intertemporal component inherent to consumption decisions when facing durable goods.
A similar reasoning applies to tobacco. As tobacco is a highly addictive good, there
is an intertemporal consideration involved in the consumption decision (health-related
problems in the future). Consequently, tobacco5 has also been removed from the data set.
In order to theoretically justify the exclusion of durable goods, I have to assume weak
separability of the individuals’ utility functions (Strotz, 1959). This assumption means
that the marginal rate of substitution between any two non-durable goods is assumed to
be independent of the quantity demanded of any durable good excluded in this analysis.
Finally, the eight commodity groups presented in Table 3.2 are used for the analysis.
Table A1.1 in Appendix A1 shows the exact composition of the commodity groups.
Table 3.2 deserves more attention. First of all, the last column indicates the fraction of
households that do not report expenditure on each commodity group. It is important
to note that a large fraction of the sample does not purchase alcoholic beverages, which
imposes some challenges in estimating the demand system later (see Section 4.4). Similarly,
the commodity group Clothing appears to have a high zero consumption share. However,
as I will argue, the reason for this is different from the case of alcoholic beverages and
will therefore not be dealt with in the estimation strategy. Nevertheless, the share of zero
expenditure on Clothing will have implications for the interpretation of the elasticities
5I hereafter include tobacco in my definition of durable goods.
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involving Clothing. Next, it might seem surprising that the mean budget share of the
category “Housing and energy” (hereafter referred to as Housing) is only 0.075. The reason
for this seemingly low number can be found when considering how the category is defined.
As all durable goods have been excluded from the analysis, so have rent and mortgage
payments. Consequently, the category only consists of household maintenance, insurance
and energy expenditure (discretionary expenses on housing), which results in the low
mean expenditure share of this category.
3.2 Price Data
A drawback of the HBS is that no price data is reported. Therefore, I have to rely on
national price index data for the estimation, which the FSO provides on their website.6
The data set contains yearly price indices on a very disaggregated level. Furthermore, a
second data set is available containing the weights of the different sub-category price indices
used for computing the aggregate national price index. Thus, one can calculate precise
price indices for the custom defined commodity groups. For instance, the commodity
group “Alcoholic beverages” (hereafter referred to as Alcohol) that originally consisted
of the sub-categories Beers (b), Wines (w), Spirits (s) and Tobacco (t). Since I removed
Tobacco from the data set due to reasons explained in Section 3.1, I had to calculate the






where pa is the aggregate price index for Alcohol (without tobacco), wi and pi are the
weights and the price indices for i 2 {b, w, s}, respectively. Equation (3.1) allows the
construction of price indices for arbitrary commodity groups.
3.3 Stone-Lewbel Prices
Unfortunately, the price indices are reported on a yearly basis in the price data set and
do not contain any seasonal or regional price variation. Consequently, price data varies
6https://www.bfs.admin.ch/bfs/en/home/statistics/prices.html. Accessed 14.05.2021.
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very little across households. Cross-sectional variation in price data can be increased ex
post by using information about the households’ budget shares. For this to be justified
theoretically, I have to assume that the sub-utility functions are Cobb-Douglas (Lewbel,
1989). For each commodity group i consisting of j = 1, . . . , ni sub-groups, the within-group














where wij represents the within-group budget share of good j in category i of a
representative household (in this case the average of all budget shares wijh). Then,











where pij is the national price index for good j in category i. The function vih(pij, wijh)
can be referred to as Stone-Lewbel price index. National price index data can be replaced
by vih(pij, wijh) for the analysis. For households that do not spend money on a specific
sub-group, i.e. wijh = 0 for any j, Stone-Lewbel prices cannot be calculated. In this case,
I replaced the missing price data by the average Stone-Lewbel price across households for
category i, which was done in other studies such as García-Enríquez and Echevarría (2016).
Table 3.3 presents the descriptive statistics of the Stone-Lewbel prices. It becomes clear
that price variation increased considerably in the case of Stone-Lewbel prices compared to
the unmodified national price index data. This is achieved by introducing cross-sectional
variation to the time-varying national price indices. Hoderlein and Mihaleva (2008) showed
that the use of Stone-Lewbel prices makes estimates more plausible and robust.
7Throughout this thesis, vectors and matrices are printed in bold in mathematical expressions.
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Table 3.3: Descriptive statistics of national price indices and Stone-Lewbel prices.




Food and non-alcoholic beverages 102.57 102.10 99.90 105.90 1.78 0
Alcoholic beverages 101.86 102.10 99.40 103.70 1.20 0
Clothing 101.11 99.00 96.80 108.10 3.81 0
Housing and energy 104.43 103.10 96.70 111.60 5.44 0
Restaurants and accommodation 97.85 98.80 91.40 101.10 3.28 0
Transport 104.19 105.10 99.50 107.70 2.88 0
Recreation and leisure 105.32 104.80 100.30 110.80 3.82 0
Other goods and services 99.37 99.60 97.10 100.80 1.16 0
Stone-Lewbel prices
Food and non-alcoholic beverages 100.33 97.97 73.93 157.97 16.71 16.61
Alcoholic beverages 57.03 56.89 39.94 132.05 15.46 15.31
Clothing 81.16 80.62 56.25 129.50 21.91 21.45
Housing and energy 94.29 97.50 47.90 106.85 11.59 11.28
Restaurants and accommodation 86.56 71.64 64.53 148.66 27.33 26.34
Transport 90.00 95.32 49.50 108.04 16.18 16.87
Recreation and leisure 87.93 93.39 45.57 106.83 16.24 16.24




This section presents the methodology applied in this thesis. Firstly, I formally introduce
the AIDS model in Section 4.1 and its quadratic extension in Section 4.2. Next, Section
4.3 explains how demographic variation can enter the model. In Section 4.4, I discuss how
I address sample selection, and I explain how expenditure endogeneity is controlled for in
Section 4.5. Finally, Section 4.6 presents the estimator used in the analysis.
4.1 AIDS Model
In this thesis, I base my analysis of consumer demand in Switzerland on the Almost
Ideal Demand System introduced by Deaton and Muellbauer (1980). In this model, it is
assumed that consumers follow PIGLOG preferences. These preferences are represented
by the minimum expenditure function for household h that takes the form
log e(p, u) = (1  u) log a(p) + u log b(p) (4.1)
with utility u 2 [0, 1] and where log stands for the natural logarithm and p is a vector of
prices. Note that subscript h has been avoided to simplify notation. In equation (4.1),
the second term reduces to zero if u = 0 and hence, a(p) can be interpreted as the cost of
subsistence. Similarly, if u = 1 the expenditure function will represent the cost of bliss.
In a next step, Deaton and Muellbauer (1980) replaced log a(p) and log b(p) by flexible
functional forms such that the first and second partial derivatives of the expenditure
function are equal to the ones of any arbitrary expenditure function. They proposed
log a(p) = ↵0 +
nX
i=1









ij log pi log pi (4.2)






where i and j are indices for specific goods and n is the number of goods, and ↵i,  i
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and  ⇤ij are parameters. By plugging these expressions into equation (4.1) one gets the
expenditure function
log e(p, u) = ↵0 +
nX
i=1















Taking the partial derivatives of this expenditure function with respect to the logarithm
of the prices gives directly the budget share equations. This is true because










where the second fraction is, by Shephard’s lemma, equal to the compensated (Hicksian)
demand qi for good i and the third fraction equals pi. Thus,






= wi(p, u). (4.6)
Consequently, following these steps, the budget share equation for good i can be written
as
wi(p, u) = ↵i +
nX
j=1






where  ij = 1/2( ⇤ij +  ⇤ji). Note that since this equation is derived with Shephard’s
lemma, wi(p, u) represents the budget share in terms of compensated demands. To get
the uncompensated budget share equation, total expenditure e(p, u) has to be set equal
to income m, which is true for standard utility maximising consumers. Hence, e(p, u) can
be inverted to get the indirect utility function. Plugging this into equation (4.7) gives the
uncompensated budget shares
wi(p,m) = ↵i +
nX
j=1
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where m is income/total expenditure. This system of budget share equations is called the









 i = 0 (4.9)
nX
j=1
 ij = 0 (4.10)
 ij =  ji (4.11)
hold, the demand system satisfies the properties of adding up (4.9), homogeneity of degree
zero in prices and income (4.10) as well as the Slutsky symmetry (4.11) implied by utility
maximisation.
The expressions for uncompensated price elasticities can then be found by logarithmic














where ✏uij is the uncompensated price elasticity of demand for good i with respect to
the price of good j and  ij is the Kronecker delta that takes the value 1 if i = j and 0
otherwise.












One can derive the compensated price elasticities of demand by making use of the Slutsky





ij + wj✏i (4.14)
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to get explicit expressions for all the three types of elasticities in the context of the AIDS
model.
The first advantage of the AIDS model is its great generality. Thanks to the flexible
functional forms proposed in equations (4.2) and (4.3), it serves as an arbitrary first-order
approximation to any demand system. This property holds if utility maximising behavior
is assumed but also for any other demand system that is represented by continuous
functions. Such generality, however, comes at the cost of having to estimate a large
number of parameters. This problem can be mitigated by imposing restrictions on the
demand system such as the ones given by equations (4.9), (4.10) and (4.11).
Secondly, it satisfies a certain form of aggregation over households. Deaton and Muellbauer
(1980) show how household-level budget shares can be aggregated to market budget shares.
They do so by first scaling down the budget shares to a per capita level. Next, the
resulting equations can be aggregated to give market budget shares with an identical form
as equation (4.8). Consequently, aggregate budget shares correspond to the budget share
of a rational representative household with a representative budget level. This property is
essential because of the aggregate time-series data used at that time (Heien and Wessells,
1990).
Thirdly, as the linear restrictions in equations (4.9), (4.10) and (4.11) are only imposed on
parameters, the demand system satisfies adding-up, homogeneity and symmetry without
loss of flexibility.
Furthermore, the AIDS is a linear function of the logarithm of income deflated by the
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price index a(p), which can be interpreted as the logarithm of real income. The sign of  i
determines whether commodities are classified as necessary or luxury goods. A negative
sign of  i (i is a necessary good) conforms to Engel’s law, which says that the budget share
devoted to a commodity group like food, for instance, declines as income rises. However,
this does not allow for non-linear Engel curves, an empirical observation made by, among
others, Banks et al. (1997), Hausman et al. (1995) and Kedir and Girma (2007).
Another drawback of the model is that the Slutsky negativity condition cannot be imposed
when estimating demands. Slutsky negativity requires that the Slutsky substitution matrix
with price derivatives of the Hicksian demands as its elements is negative semidefinite.
Since this matrix involves the optimal demands by definition, which depend on parameters
and the right-hand side variables, it cannot be imposed as a restriction on the parameters
alone. However, given the estimated parameters and optimal demands, it can be verified
by calculating the eigenvalues of the Slutsky matrix.
The AIDS model given in equation (4.8) is linear conditional on the last term involving
a(p). This non-linearity of the income term complicates estimation. However, a(p) can be
replaced by a price index at hand, which reduces the AIDS to a linear approximation of
the AIDS, and can be estimated easily with OLS. Blanciforti and Green (1983) proposed




wi log pi (4.18)
This linear approximation can be made if prices are closely collinear (a(p) '  P ⇤). The
variation of the AIDS model with the Stone price index as an approximation for a(p)
came to be known as the Linear Approximate AIDS or LA/AIDS.
4.2 Non-Linear Engel Curves and Quadratic Extension
In the AIDS model, Engel curves for good i are represented by the parameter  i, as
@wi/@ logm =  i. Thus, the AIDS model assumes parallel linear Engel curves. However,
Banks et al. (1997) suggested that Engel curves appear to be non-linear for some commodity
groups. For both alcohol and clothing, they observed a \-shaped functional form. Their
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argument was supported by both non-parametric kernel regressions as well as quadratic
polynomial regressions. Hence, according to this finding, the budget shares of alcohol
and clothing are expected to be increasing at a low income level, while they decrease
after peaking at a higher income level. To account for these non-linear Engel curves, they
proposed to extend Deaton and Muellbauer (1980)’s AIDS model by a quadratic term.
Banks et al. (1997) started by assuming the indirect utility function to be given by








where (logm  log a(p))/b(p) is equal to the indirect utility function of the AIDS model
and  (p) is differentiable and homogeneous of degree zero in p. Banks et al. (1997) defined
a(p) and b(p) as in equations (4.2) and (4.3) following Deaton and Muellbauer (1980)’s




 i log pi (4.20)
where
P
i  i = 0. If  (p) = 0, equation (4.19) collapses to the indirect utility function of
the AIDS and the model reduces to the one proposed by Deaton and Muellbauer (1980).
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Plugging equations (4.2), (4.3) and (4.20) into equation (4.19) and applying Roy’s identity
as in equation (4.21) gives
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wi(p,m) = ↵i +
nX
j=1















This equation system is called the Quadratic Almost Ideal Demand System. The “quadratic”
qualifier comes from the last term, which is quadratic in the logarithm of real income.
Again, if  i = 0, the system reduces to the AIDS model. Therefore, the QUAIDS serves
as a generalisation of the AIDS, where the original AIDS is contained in the QUAIDS
as a special case. In order for the QUAIDS to satisfy the restrictions imposed by utility




 i = 0 (4.23)
If conditions (4.9), (4.10), (4.11) and (4.23) hold, the demand system satisfies adding-
up, homogeneity of degree zero in prices and income, as well as symmetry of the
Slutsky substitution matrix. However, similar to the case of the AIDS model, negative
semidefiniteness of the Slutsky substitution matrix can neither be tested nor imposed.
Here again, it can be checked ex post by calculating the eigenvalues of the Slutsky matrix.
In a next step, price elasticities of demand can be derived following the formulas given by
























































ij + wj✏i (4.26)
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Equation (4.26) is written in this general form in order to save space.
The QUAIDS exhibits the same flexible functional form as the AIDS model. But in
addition to this, it allows for budget shares to be increasing/decreasing in income up to a
certain level and decreasing/increasing afterwards (quadratic Engel curves). The model is
furthermore linear in its parameters conditional on a(p) and b(p). Also, the number of
additional parameters to be estimated is kept to a minimum compared with the AIDS.
Thanks to these advantages, the QUAIDS model has arguably become the most popular
model for estimating full demand systems.
4.3 Demographic Shifters
The QUAIDS defined in equation (4.22) can be enhanced by socio-demographic variables.
These variables enter the equation system linearly and cause the constant term ↵i to be
shifted up- or downwards, which allows for these variables to influence the budget shares
of households. Consider the vector of socio-demographic variables s with elements sl for
l = 1, . . . , L. Thus,




where ⇠i’s are the socio-demographic parameters for the ith budget share equation.
Equation (4.27) can then be combined with the QUAIDS from equation (4.22).
4.4 Censored Dependent Variable
The dependent variables in this analysis are the budget shares. Households choose to
allocate between none (wi = 0) and all of their budget (wi = 1) to commodity i. As
a consequence, the dependent variables inherently take only values between 0 and 1.
Table 3.2 reveals that none of the households allocate their entire budget to any category.
However, the minimum in each category is zero, implying that there is at least one
household in each category that reported zero consumption. Therefore, the dependent
variables are censored at their lower limit zero. Tobin (1958) first showed that estimating
an equation with a censored dependent variable using standard OLS results in biased and
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inconsistent estimates. His approach to solving the problem can be extended to the case
of truncated and other non-randomly selected samples. The first work on sample selection
in economics was done by Roy (1951), who discusses the issue in the context of workers
selecting their occupation. Heckman (1979) proposed a two-step estimator to correct for
the resulting bias from non-random sample selection.
In the data set used in this thesis, many observations report zero consumption for the
commodity group Alcohol. They might desist from purchasing alcoholic beverages for
several reasons, including health-related concerns, religious considerations or personal
rationales. All of these reasons have in common that they imply an ex ante decision of
households. According to this argument, individuals first face the decision whether to
consume or not (i.e. whether to spend money on the good or not). If they decide to
allocate parts of their budget to the good, they will subsequently choose how much of
the good they will purchase. Hence, this can be regarded as a sample selection process
affecting the budget share equation for Alcohol. In this thesis, I will follow the approach
of Heien and Wessells (1990) who applied a two-stage Heckman-type procedure to correct
for sample selection in the context of the AIDS model.8 Let
wih = fi(ph,mh, sh) + uih (i = 1, . . . , n) (4.28)
where wih is the budget share of household h = 1, . . . , H for good i, ph is a vector of
prices, mh is income, sh is a vector of socio-demographic variables, and uih is the random





1, if d⇤h = z0h⇡ + ⌫h > 0
0, if d⇤h = z0h⇡ + ⌫h  0
(4.29)
where dh is a dummy for household h that takes the value 1 if positive expenditure on the
n
th good (Alcohol, in this case) is observed (“consumer”) and 0 otherwise (“abstainer”).
d
⇤
h is the latent variable, z0h is a vector of exogenous independent variables, ⇡ is the
corresponding vector of parameters and ⌫h is the random error term. Hence, equation
8The same logic can directly be translated to the QUAIDS model.
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i (ph,mh, sh) + u
c
ih (i = 1, . . . , n) (4.30)





i (ph,mh, sh) + u
a
ih (i = 1, . . . , n  1) (4.31)
if h is an abstainer (superscript a). If there is sample selection, both ⌫h and uch, as well as
⌫h and uah are possibly correlated. Assuming that the error terms are jointly normally








































for abstainers. Under these assumptions, one can derive the conditional expectation
function for budget share equation i for consumers of n by applying the rules for conditional
expectations of normally distributed random variables.
E(wcih | ph,mh, sh, dh = 1) = f ci (ph,mh, sh) + E(ucih | dh = 1)
= f ci (ph,mh, sh) + E(u
c
ih) +  ⌫uciE(⌫h | dh = 1)
= f ci (ph,mh, sh) +  ⌫uciE(⌫h | ⌫h >  z
0
h⇡)
= f ci (ph,mh, sh) +  ⌫uci (z
0
h⇡) (i = 1, . . . , n) (4.34)
The conditional expectation function for budget share equation i for abstainers of n can
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be derived similarly.
E(waih | ph,mh, sh, dh = 0) = fai (ph,mh, sh) + E(uaih | dh = 0)
= fai (ph,mh, sh) + E(u
a
ih) +  ⌫uai E(⌫h | dh = 0)
= fai (ph,mh, sh) +  ⌫uai E(⌫h | ⌫h <  z
0
h⇡)
= fai (ph,mh, sh)   ⌫uai  ( z
0
h⇡) (i = 1, . . . , n  1)
(4.35)
In equations (4.34) and (4.35),  (·) =  (·) (·) , where  (·) is the standard normal density
function and  (·) is the standard normal cumulative distribution function. This quotient
is referred to as the inverse Mills ratio (IMR). Since the vector zh consists of observed
variables, the probability of a household being a consumer can be written as
P (dh = 1 | zh) =  (z0h⇡) (4.36)
This probit model is estimated with maximum likelihood (ML) method. Given the













for abstainers. For the estimation, I partitioned the sample into consumers and abstainers,
and a QUAIDS is estimated for each group. The IMRs enter the QUAIDS linearly in
a similar way as described in Section 4.3. For consumers, I included the IMR given by
(4.37), while for abstainers, (4.38) is used instead.
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4.5 Endogeneity of Total Expenditure
When estimating the demand system, total expenditure is likely to be endogenous (Blundell
and Robin, 1999). Since total expenditure is defined as the sum of the (endogenous)
expenditures on each commodity group, one must expect total expenditure to be jointly
endogenous. It seems plausible that there are unobservable characteristics of households
that affect both their total expenditure and their demand behavior. An example could be a
household’s wealth (which is unobserved) and presumably affects both expenditure shares
and total expenditure. It seems plausible that a wealthier household spends more money in
total, but also more on luxury goods and less on essentials. Hence, both total expenditure
and the expenditures on each commodity group correlate with the error terms in the
budget share equations. Similarly, we have to suspect that a common shock will determine
both total expenditure and expenditure shares. A sudden wealth increase of a household
(e.g. due to inheritance) is likely to affect both the household’s total expenditure and the
individual budget shares. Again, this would imply that total expenditure correlates with
the error terms, and there are likely to be endogeneity problems.
If total expenditure mh in the QUAIDS model is endogenous, it could possibly be fixed
using an instrument variable rh. Such a variable has to satisfy the following restrictions
in order to be valid:
1. Relevance Cov(mh, rh) 6= 0
2. Exogeneity Cov(rh, uih) = 0
In other words, the instrument rh must be correlated with total expenditure while being
uncorrelated with the error term of the outcome equation(s) uih. The most commonly used
candidate to correct for expenditure endogeneity is (log) disposable household income (see,
among many, Blundell and Robin (1999)), which I adopt in my analysis. The argument
is the following: Log disposable income is assumed to be a positive determinant of total
expenditure in the sense that higher income leads to higher expenditure, which seems
plausible. However, it is less clear whether the instrument is, in fact, exogenous. It
might be questionable to assume that disposable income is uncorrelated with unobservable
factors determining the budget shares as income itself is – to some extent – a decision
variable by households. If a given household has an inherently strong preference for
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luxury goods, its members might seek better-paid jobs to satisfy these needs. Similarly,
a household without such preference might be happy with less money and thus could
experience a weaker incentive to seek jobs with a high salary. If this example were true,
the exogeneity assumption would be violated and the instrument Log disposable income
would correlate with the error terms of the budget share equations.
The endogeneity issue is traditionally addressed with a Two-Stage Least Squares (2SLS)
estimator. However, Blundell and Robin (1999) suggested testing and correcting for this
endogeneity in the conditionally linear demand system by implementing an augmented
regression approach proposed by Hausman (1978). They showed that this approach is
equivalent to the 2SLS estimator but has the significant advantage of providing a test for
endogeneity of mh. The augmented regression approach relies on the assumption that the
error terms uih have the orthogonal decomposition
uih = ⇢ibvh + "ih (4.39)
where bvh are the residuals computed from the first stage regression of mh on the exogenous
explanatory variables as well as the instrument rh. The independent variables are the
demographic shifters, the logarithms of the price variables as well as the identifying
instrument. Then, by assuming E("ih | ph,mh, sh, bvh) = 0, the parameters of the QUAIDS
model are successfully identified.
Finally, by combining the adjustments to the QUAIDS discussed in Sections 4.3, 4.4 and
4.5, the two models that I estimate can be written as
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c























+ ⇢ibv + "i (i = 1, . . . , n)
(4.40)
for consumers, and
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a























+ ⇢ibv + "i (i = 1, . . . , n  1)
(4.41)
for abstainers.
4.6 Iterated Linear Least Squares Estimator
In this analysis, I applied an iterated linear least squares estimator (ILLE) proposed
by Blundell and Robin (1999) for conditionally linear demand systems to estimate the
equation systems (4.40) and (4.41). The use of this estimator is possible because the
AIDS model is linear in parameters conditional on the translog price index log(a(p,✓)).9
The estimator then consists of the following series of iterations: It takes a starting value
for ✓(p), estimates the demand system using a linear moment estimator to get updated
estimates ✓(p+1). Given ✓(p+1), an updated price index log a(p,✓(p+1)) can be calculated.
Subsequently, it repeats the estimation using log a(p,✓(p+1)) instead of log a(p,✓(p)) until
numerical convergence is reached. Blundell and Robin (1999) argue that this approach has
a significant computational advantage over estimating the demand system simultaneously.
They further show that the estimator fully identifies the parameters of the non-linear
AIDS model and that it exhibits consistency and asymptotic normality. In addition,
they prove that the ILLE b✓ is asymptotically equivalent to the Non-Linear Three-Stage
Least Square (NL3S) estimator ✓̃. The ILLE has been implemented in Stata software by
Lecocq and Robin (2015) in the user-written Stata command aidsills. If the number of
iterations in the aidsills command is set to one, the model is equal to the LA/AIDS
model that takes the Stone price index to deflate income.
9✓ represents the parameters of the translog price index.
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5 Analysis
In this section, I proceed by presenting the estimation results. In Section 5.1, I discuss the
selection model and the estimates from the probit model. Section 5.2 will subsequently
be devoted to the first stage regression of the augmented regression approach, while
Section 5.3 discusses estimation results of the QUAIDS model for both consumers and
abstainers of alcohol. Section 5.4 covers the empirical validity of the postulates imposed by
traditional demand theory. Finally, Section 5.5 discusses a possible approach to imposing
negativity.
5.1 Selection Model
First, I estimated the selection model to determine the probability of household h to be a
consumer of alcohol. I proceed according to the approach discussed in Section 4.4. The
set of independent variables is chosen similarly to the ones in the QUAIDS model. There
are, however, some differences.
1. I included a dummy variable indicating whether a household smokes as an explanatory
variable. Smoking is potentially an essential factor explaining alcohol consumption, and I
expect households that smoke to be more likely to consume alcohol. Cameron and Trivedi
(2009, p. 546) discuss the importance of not using the same set of independent variables
in the selection model as in the outcome model. They argue that an excluded “instrument”
can help prevent the inverse Mills ratio from being collinear with the regressors of the
outcome model. Hence, following this logic, I argue that being a smoker does not affect
the budget allocation decision but is indeed a predictor of a household being a consumer
of alcohol. Of course, this assumption is debatable, as households that spend money
on tobacco have less money available for other goods and have to adjust the optimal
allocation of their money.
2. Following the reasoning from Section 4.5, I assume total expenditure to be endogenous.
Therefore, I did not use total expenditure as an explanatory variable but rather log of real
disposable income and log of real disposable income squared. Of course, the exogeneity
assumption of income is also debatable in this case. However, I assume it to be at least
closer to exogeneity than total expenditure.
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3. Due to some issues related to the collinearity of the inverse Mills ratio and the regressors
in the outcome model (see bullet point 1.), I included the (real) national price indices for
each commodity group instead of the Stone-Lewbel prices.
4. Yearly dummies have been dropped from the selection model because of multicollinearity
between the dummy variables and the real price index variables.
The independent variables in the selection model were thus: A dummy indicating whether
the household spent money on tobacco, a dummy for whether a woman is the reference
person of the household, the number of children, the number of adults, the number of
pensioners, the number of earners, real income and real income squared, regional dummies
and real price indices for the eight commodity groups. The dependent variable is a dummy
for whether household h reported positive expenditure on alcohol.
It can be seen that most of the variables are statistically significant. Most importantly, the
variable Smoker, which is the excluded variable from the outcome model, is very precisely
estimated. Its sign is also in line with what one would expect – being a smoker makes a
household more likely to consume alcohol. Furthermore, if a woman is the households’
reference person, the household is less likely to consume alcohol. Similarly, a higher
number of children seems to decrease the likelihood of consuming alcohol. If there are
more adults or more pensioners in a given household, it is more likely to be a consumer
of alcohol, while the sign for the number of earners is negative, however. Real income
is less significant than the other variables, and real income squared does not have any
statistical significance. However, the signs of those variables are as expected, and the
selection model seems reasonable. Given the estimates in Table 5.1, I calculated the linear
predictions of the probit model. Next, these fitted values can be used to calculate the
IMR for each household.
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Woman reference person -0.115⇤⇤⇤
(0.017)
Number of children -0.064⇤⇤⇤
(0.008)
Number of adults 0.096⇤⇤⇤
(0.012)
Number of pensioners 0.244⇤⇤⇤
(0.016)









Prices Yes (real price indices)
Note: Standard errors in parentheses.
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001.
32 5.2 First Stage Regressions
5.2 First Stage Regressions
For the estimation of the QUAIDS, the sample has been partitioned into consumers
of alcohol and abstainers of alcohol. The same reasoning applies to the respective IV
estimations, and I estimated two different models for consumers and abstainers. The
independent variables used in the first stages are the same as those used in the second
stages, i.e. in the demand system. The only difference is that Log disposable income
is added to the model as an instrument. The dependent variable is the log of total
expenditure. The OLS estimates of the two first stages are displayed in Table 5.2.
Firstly, notice that apart from Number of earners, the estimated coefficients have the
same signs in both models. This finding is in line with what one would expect, as
there is no specific reason to believe that any of the explanatory variables would affect
total expenditure differently for one of the groups. Secondly, most of the coefficients
are rather precisely estimated (except for the coefficient of Woman reference person for
consumers). Most importantly, the estimated coefficients of Log disposable income is
highly statistically significant, supporting the relevance hypothesis (Cov(mh, rh) 6= 0).
The magnitude suggesting that an 1 % increase in disposable income leads to a 0.52 %
(consumers) and a 0.54 % (abstainers) increase in total expenditure also seems plausible.
If we consider the other estimates, we see that the variable Woman reference person leads
to a lower total expenditure (2.5 % for consumers and 0.1 % for abstainers). Furthermore,
one additional child is estimated to increase total expenditure by 3.8 % (consumers)
and 4.8 % (abstainers), respectively. Similarly, the number of adults and the number of
pensioners are estimated to lead to higher total expenditures. It seems surprising that
the number of earners has a negative sign for both groups. One might think that an
additional earner should lead to higher total expenses as it is an extra household member
that consumes goods and services. However, the fact that the additional earner is also an
additional (consuming) household member is already captured by the variable Number of
adults (if the earner is also an adult). Similarly, the higher income induced by additional
earners is controlled for by the income variable. The “remaining” effect of an additional
earner could indeed be negative since a working person has less time to consume goods
and services. Therefore, the negative coefficient is, in fact, not counterintuitive.
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Table 5.2: First stage regressions for consumers and abstainers of alcohol.
Log total expenditure
Consumers Abstainers
Log disposable income 0.521⇤⇤⇤ 0.535⇤⇤⇤
(0.010) (0.013)
Woman reference person -0.025⇤⇤⇤ -0.001
(0.007) (0.009)
Number of children 0.038⇤⇤⇤ 0.048⇤⇤⇤
(0.004) (0.005)
Number of adults 0.133⇤⇤⇤ 0.106⇤⇤⇤
(0.005) (0.007)
Number of pensioners 0.198⇤⇤⇤ 0.189⇤⇤⇤
(0.008) (0.012)
Number of earners -0.034⇤⇤⇤ -0.004
(0.005) (0.007)





Yearly dummies Yes Yes
Regional dummies Yes Yes
Prices Yes (Stone-Lewbel) Yes (Stone-Lewbel)
Note: Standard errors in parentheses. * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001.
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As mentioned in Section 4.4, I estimated the two QUAIDS models for consumers and
abstainers given by equations (4.40) and (4.41). The dependent variables are the budget
shares of all commodity groups. The regressors are the logs of Stone-Lewbel prices, the
log of real total expenditure and its respective quadratic term, and the predicted residuals
from the first stage regressions. Furthermore, the following socio-demographic variables
enter the demand system linearly: Woman reference person, Number of children, Number
of adults, Number of pensioners, Number of earners, regional dummies10 as well as yearly
dummies11. For each group (consumers and abstainers), the appropriate inverse Mills
ratio was added as an additional regressor. Lastly, I set the parameter ↵0 to 5.99, which
is the minimum value of the log of total expenditure in the sample for the base year. In
doing so, I followed Deaton and Muellbauer (1980) and Banks et al. (1997), who argued
that ↵0 can be interpreted as outlay required for a minimum standard of living. In the
estimation procedure, homogeneity was imposed by considering only n  1 relative prices
(Deaton and Muellbauer, 1980, p. 318). After the occurrence of numerical convergence of
the estimated parameters, one last iteration was performed imposing symmetry (Lecocq
and Robin, 2015).
Due to the large number of estimated coefficients, it is unfortunately impracticable to
present all estimation results in this section. Table A1.2 and A1.3 in Appendix A1 present
the raw estimates for the interested reader. These tables demonstrate that all commodities
except Food and Others have statistically significant coefficients of the quadratic income
terms – both for consumers and abstainers. This supports the use of the QUAIDS rather
than the AIDS.
Arguably the most meaningful results of the QUAIDS estimation, however, are the different
elasticities of demand that can be computed with equations (4.24), (4.25) and (4.26). I
calculated the elasticities on a household level for all households in the sample, given that
they had positive predicted budget shares.
10The regions are: Geneva, Northwest, Plateau, Zürich, East, Central and Ticino. Ticino has been
omitted and is therefore the reference category.
11The time period is 2006-2017. 2006 is omitted and thus the reference category.
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Table 5.3: Predicted budget shares ( bwi), observed budget shares (wi) and income
elasticities (✏i) for consumers and abstainers of alcohol (sample averages).
Consumers Abstainers
bwi wi ✏i bwi wi ✏i
Food 0.192*** 0.193 0.313*** 0.186*** 0.189 0.280***
(0.001) – (0.021) (0.001) – (0.028)
Alcohol 0.028*** 0.029 0.755***
(0.000) – (0.068)
Clothing 0.059*** 0.057 1.567*** 0.060*** 0.057 1.607***
(0.000) – (0.045) (0.001) – (0.056)
Housing 0.067*** 0.069 0.641*** 0.072*** 0.074 0.579***
(0.000) – (0.034) (0.001) – (0.042)
Restaurants 0.148*** 0.142 1.224*** 0.147*** 0.140 1.315***
(0.001) – (0.028) (0.001) – (0.037)
Transport 0.212*** 0.215 0.770*** 0.238*** 0.241 0.726***
(0.001) – (0.023) (0.001) – (0.027)
Recreation 0.147*** 0.149 1.645*** 0.147*** 0.149 1.719***
(0.001) – (0.030) (0.001) – (0.037)
Others 0.147*** 0.146 1.345*** 0.150*** 0.149 1.273***
(0.001) – (0.031) (0.001) – (0.038)
Note: Standard errors in parentheses. * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001.
Table 5.3 summarises the predicted budget shares, the observed budget shares, and the
average income elasticities for consumers and abstainers. Firstly, none of the groups
categorises as an inferior good, as all income elasticities are positive. On the one hand,
Food, Alcohol, Housing and Transport appear to be necessary goods with income elasticities
less than unity. On the other hand, Clothing, Restaurants, Recreation, and Others are
luxury goods, with increasing demand as their consumers’ income rise. Note, however, that
the elasticity of Clothing is possibly underestimated. As can be seen in Table 3.2, Clothing
exhibits a large share of zero expenditure. I did not control for the zero consumption
share of Clothing since this is due to the infrequency of purchases rather than sample
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selection. If households were observed for a more extended period, more households would
report positive expenditure. The fact that many households did not purchase clothes in
the survey period might cause the estimated elasticity to be biased towards zero.
The averages of the predicted budget shares are very close to the observed averages
suggesting a relatively good overall fit of the models. Finally, all of these estimates exhibit
low standard errors and are rather precisely estimated.
Next, Table 5.4 shows the mean of all individual elasticities computed in the sample. The
table is divided into uncompensated and compensated price elasticities of demand.
All diagonal elements (own-price elasticities) have a negative sign. This finding is in line
with what one would expect from economic theory under the assumption that none of
these commodity groups exhibits the properties of a Giffen good. Food, Alcohol, Clothing
Restaurants, Transport, and Recreation have on average estimated elasticities less than
unity while Housing and Others have on average elastic demand. All of these own-price
elasticities are rather precisely estimated, with relatively low standard errors. Again, it is
important to keep in mind that the elasticities involving Clothing should be interpreted
with caution.
The estimates for the compensated price elasticities of demand are, in general, very
similar to the uncompensated price elasticities of demand discussed in the paragraph
above. Almost all compensated elasticities have the same sign as their uncompensated
counterpart. The only exceptions are some cross-price elasticities that have previously
been estimated to be close to zero. It seems, however, that the compensated elasticities
are less negative than the uncompensated ones. This result makes sense: If a household
is financially compensated for a price increase (to keep utility constant), it will adjust
its demand for any normal good to a lesser extent than in the absence of financial
reimbursement. Hence, this empirical finding is in line with the theoretical fact that
compensated demand only reflects the substitution effect, while uncompensated demand
both represents substitution and income effect. Furthermore, the same commodity groups
have elastic and inelastic demand as in the uncompensated case. However, the own-price
elasticity of housing is closer to unity, and it is probably more appropriate to classify it as
a unit elastic good, given its standard errors.
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Table 5.4: Uncompensated and compensated price elasticities of demand for consumers
of alcohol (sample averages).
Food Alcohol Clothing Housing Restaurants Transport Recreation Others
Uncompensated
Food -0.886*** 0.030** 0.005 0.062*** -0.001 0.146*** 0.173*** 0.157***
(0.017) (0.009) (0.011) (0.019) (0.013) (0.015) (0.016) (0.014)
Alcohol 0.124* -0.216*** -0.203*** -0.060 -0.131** 0.029 -0.120* -0.177***
(0.056) (0.032) (0.037) (0.062) (0.043) (0.050) (0.053) (0.046)
Clothing -0.225*** -0.120*** -0.317*** -0.182*** -0.278*** -0.348*** -0.203*** 0.106***
(0.038) (0.020) (0.025) (0.042) (0.028) (0.034) (0.035) (0.031)
Housing 0.114*** -0.022 -0.104*** -1.127*** -0.130*** 0.329*** 0.211*** 0.088***
(0.028) (0.015) (0.018) (0.031) (0.021) (0.025) (0.026) (0.023)
Restaurants -0.176*** -0.038** -0.090*** -0.099*** -0.325*** -0.163*** -0.285*** -0.050*
(0.024) (0.013) (0.015) (0.026) (0.018) (0.021) (0.022) (0.019)
Transport 0.044* 0.003 -0.049*** 0.096*** -0.046** -0.750*** -0.065*** -0.003
(0.019) (0.010) (0.012) (0.021) (0.014) (0.017) (0.018) (0.016)
Recreation -0.030 -0.048*** -0.086*** 0.029 -0.350*** -0.280*** -0.983*** 0.102***
(0.025) (0.014) (0.016) (0.028) (0.019) (0.023) (0.023) (0.021)
Others 0.007 -0.050*** 0.055*** -0.007 -0.068*** -0.127*** 0.146*** -1.302***
(0.026) (0.014) (0.017) (0.029) (0.020) (0.023) (0.024) (0.021)
Compensated
Food -0.826*** 0.039*** 0.023* 0.084*** 0.046*** 0.213*** 0.219*** 0.203***
(0.018) (0.009) (0.011) (0.019) (0.011) (0.014) (0.015) (0.013)
Alcohol 0.269*** -0.195*** -0.159*** -0.009 -0.019 0.189*** -0.009 -0.066
(0.061) (0.032) (0.036) (0.063) (0.038) (0.047) (0.049) (0.045)
Clothing 0.076 -0.076*** -0.225*** -0.077 -0.046 -0.015 0.027 0.336***
(0.041) (0.020) (0.025) (0.042) (0.025) (0.031) (0.033) (0.030)
Housing 0.237*** -0.004 -0.067*** -1.084*** -0.035 0.465*** 0.305*** 0.182***
(0.030) (0.015) (0.018) (0.031) (0.019) (0.023) (0.024) (0.022)
Restaurants 0.059* -0.004 -0.018 -0.016 -0.144*** 0.098*** -0.105*** 0.130***
(0.025) (0.013) (0.015) (0.026) (0.016) (0.020) (0.021) (0.019)
Transport 0.192*** 0.025* -0.004 0.148*** 0.068*** -0.586*** 0.048** 0.110***
(0.021) (0.010) (0.012) (0.021) (0.013) (0.016) (0.017) (0.015)
Recreation 0.286*** -0.002 0.011 0.140*** -0.106*** 0.070*** -0.742*** 0.343***
(0.027) (0.014) (0.016) (0.028) (0.017) (0.021) (0.022) (0.020)
Others 0.266*** -0.013 0.134*** 0.084** 0.131*** 0.159*** 0.344*** -1.105***
(0.028) (0.014) (0.017) (0.029) (0.017) (0.022) (0.023) (0.020)
Note: Standard errors in parentheses. * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001.
The estimated uncompensated elasticities for abstainers of alcohol are presented in the
top panel of Table 5.5. Only seven commodity groups are observed for abstainers, as the
budget share of Alcohol is inherently equal to zero for these observations. The average
of the own-price elasticities is negative for all commodity groups. The estimates are
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generally very similar to the ones obtained for consumers and are in line with what could
be expected. All commodity groups appear to have inelastic demand except for Others,
which has an estimated own-price elasticity lower than -1. The uncompensated elasticities
for abstainers seem to compare to those obtained for alcohol consumers regarding their
estimated magnitude.
Table 5.5: Uncompensated and compensated price elasticities of demand for abstainers
of alcohol (sample averages).
Food Clothing Housing Restaurants Transport Recreation Others
Uncompensated
Food -0.827*** 0.004 0.069** 0.006 0.094*** 0.185*** 0.190***
(0.022) (0.016) (0.023) (0.019) (0.020) (0.020) (0.018)
Clothing -0.235*** -0.404*** -0.203*** -0.272*** -0.417*** -0.160*** 0.084*
(0.045) (0.033) (0.048) (0.038) (0.041) (0.041) (0.038)
Housing 0.124*** -0.109*** -0.887*** -0.144*** 0.290*** 0.071* 0.075**
(0.033) (0.024) (0.035) (0.028) (0.030) (0.030) (0.028)
Restaurants -0.186*** -0.094*** -0.123*** -0.342*** -0.210*** -0.318*** -0.043
(0.029) (0.021) (0.031) (0.025) (0.027) (0.027) (0.025)
Transport -0.009 -0.052*** 0.077*** -0.043* -0.603*** -0.073*** -0.023
(0.022) (0.015) (0.023) (0.018) (0.020) (0.020) (0.018)
Recreation -0.034 -0.073*** -0.047 -0.376*** -0.354*** -0.816*** -0.019
(0.030) (0.022) (0.032) (0.025) (0.027) (0.027) (0.025)
Others 0.051 0.054* -0.014 -0.036 -0.166*** 0.047 -1.209***
(0.030) (0.022) (0.032) (0.026) (0.027) (0.028) (0.025)
Compensated
Food -0.775*** 0.021 0.089*** 0.047** 0.161*** 0.226*** 0.231***
(0.024) (0.016) (0.024) (0.017) (0.018) (0.018) (0.017)
Clothing 0.064 -0.307*** -0.088 -0.036 -0.034 0.076* 0.324***
(0.049) (0.033) (0.048) (0.034) (0.038) (0.038) (0.036)
Housing 0.232*** -0.074** -0.845*** -0.059* 0.428*** 0.156*** 0.162***
(0.036) (0.024) (0.035) (0.025) (0.027) (0.028) (0.026)
Restaurants 0.059 -0.015 -0.029 -0.149*** 0.103*** -0.124*** 0.154***
(0.032) (0.021) (0.032) (0.023) (0.025) (0.025) (0.024)
Transport 0.126*** -0.009 0.129*** 0.064*** -0.430*** 0.034 0.086***
(0.023) (0.016) (0.023) (0.016) (0.018) (0.018) (0.017)
Recreation 0.286*** 0.031 0.076* -0.124*** 0.055* -0.563*** 0.238***
(0.033) (0.022) (0.032) (0.023) (0.025) (0.025) (0.024)
Others 0.288*** 0.131*** 0.077* 0.151*** 0.137*** 0.234*** -1.019***
(0.033) (0.022) (0.032) (0.023) (0.025) (0.026) (0.024)
Note: Standard errors in parentheses. * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001.
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The compensated elasticities appear to follow a similar pattern as observed for consumers.
Most compensated elasticities are less negative than the uncompensated ones, again
indicating that demand for normal goods is less responsive to price changes if households
are financially compensated for the welfare loss associated with these price changes. Similar
to the case of consumers, most uncompensated and compensated elasticities have the
same sign, and their magnitudes do generally not differ dramatically from each other.
5.4 Testing Postulates from Demand Theory
As mentioned in the introduction, one of the purposes of applied demand analysis is to
test the empirical validity of economic theory using real-world data. The four postulates
of interest are (i) adding-up, (ii) homogeneity, (iii) symmetry and (iv) negativity. Since
adding-up is satisfied by construction, I will focus on the remaining three restrictions.
The Wald statistic for the general test of the linear null hypotheses H0 : R#  r = 0 with
h linear hypotheses is given by




(Rb#  r) a⇠  2h (5.1)
where # is a K ⇥ 1 parameter vector with its empirical counterpart b#. R is a h ⇥ K
matrix, r is an h⇥ 1 vector (h  K) and bV(·) is an estimator for the variance-covariance
matrix. The Wald statistic is then approximately  2h distributed, which can be used to
evaluate whether to reject H0.
In order to test (ii) homogeneity, I estimated an unconstrained QUAIDS model. Then,
the Wald statistic for the restrictions (4.10) can be calculated according to equation (5.1).
In this model, the  27-statistic with seven degrees of freedom is 381.25 for consumers, and
the  26-statistic with six degrees of freedom is 233.62 for abstainers. The corresponding
probabilities are below any conventional significance level, and homogeneity is therefore
jointly rejected in both cases. However, one cannot entirely trust the estimated  2-
statistics. The inclusion of the IMRs in the QUAIDS models implies that the estimated
variances of the coefficients are too low. Hence, the  2-statistics are calculated based on
underestimated variances and are therefore too large. Still, given the large magnitude
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of the  2-statistics, it would be surprising if the test result changed dramatically by
correcting for the wrongly estimated variances.
Similarly, I tested (iii) symmetry after running a homogeneity constrained QUAIDS model.
Here again, a  2-test can be applied to test the joint hypothesis given in equation (4.11).
For consumers of alcohol, the  221-statistic is 668.07, while for abstainers, the  215-statistic
is 351.20. Hence, for both groups, symmetry is rejected at any conventional significance
level. The same argument as previously suggests that the  2-statistics are overestimated
due to wrong standard errors. It is, however, hard to believe that correcting for the
standard errors would have changed the result of the  2-test.
These test results provide evidence that homogeneity and symmetry do not seem to
hold in the unconstrained models. Due to the fundamentality of the homogeneity and
symmetry restrictions, it is convenient to regard them as given rather than as evidence for
non-rational behavior. Therefore, I proceeded with imposing the restrictions as explained
in Section 5.3.
Lastly, and probably most interestingly, one can assess the empirical validity of (iv)
negativity. Since this restriction cannot be imposed, it has to be checked ex post. In
order to do so, I calculated the (modified) substitution matrix K for each household. This
matrix is defined as the Slutsky matrix S with elements sij = @hi(p,m)/@pj pre and post
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This matrix has the same eigenvalues as S and is, in practice, more straightforward to
calculate than the Slutsky matrix (Deaton and Muellbauer, 1980). I compute matrix
K for all households in the sample and check each observation’s largest eigenvalue. If
this value is less than zero for a given household, the matrix is negative definite and the
household has a concave expenditure function as postulated by demand theory.12
The result of these calculations is somewhat surprising and puzzling. I find that only
10’716 out of 34’295 households (31.2 %) in the sample have a negative definite substitution
matrix (or, equivalently, a concave expenditure function). I furthermore checked the
diagonal elements of the matrix for each household. The result, however, is not much
more promising. Only 15’261 households (44.5 %) have a substitution matrix with solely
negative diagonal elements. Hence, most observations violate the fundamental postulate
of demand theory that compensated demand for good i decreases when the price for good
i increases. Hoderlein and Mihaleva (2008) found that negativity cannot be rejected for
70 % of their observations when Stone-Lewbel prices are used, which is a considerably
better result than what I find in this thesis. I reproduced Tables 5.3, 5.4 and 5.5 for the
sample that does not violate negativity (see Tables A1.4, A1.5 and A1.6 in Appendix A1).
It seems that the estimates are, in general, very similar to the ones obtained previously.
In order to learn more about what households violate Slutsky negativity, I estimated a
probit model with a dummy that equals one for households that violate negativity as
a dependent variable. The independent variables are the following socio-demographic
variables: Woman reference person, Number of children, Number of adults, Number of
pensioners, Number of earners, Log disposable income and a dummy indicating whether
the household is a consumer of alcohol. Lastly, I included an indicator for whether the
household was assigned a mean Stone-Lewbel price for any of the eight commodity groups
(for any of the seven groups if the household is an abstainer of alcohol). The results are
displayed in Table A1.7 in Appendix A1. It seems like all the independent variables are
significant determinants of whether a household violates negativity.
In Figures 5.1 and 5.2, I plotted the estimated income elasticities for all consumers
and abstainers who satisfy the negativity restriction against the logarithm of their total
12Similarly, matrix K could be set up as an n ⇥ n matrix. In this case, the maximum eigenvalue
should be equal to zero and the remaining ones negative. Thus, considering n goods, the matrix has to
be negative semidefinite for Slutsky negativity to be satisfied (Deaton and Muellbauer, 1980).
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expenditure. The red line is a quadratic fit of the relationship between the two variables.
This relationship is interesting because it reveals how households with different incomes
are predicted to adjust the demand for the groups studied if their incomes change.
When comparing the two figures, the relationships between income elasticities and log
total expenditure seem to be similar within each commodity group for consumers and
abstainers (leaving aside the commodity group Alcohol, of course). The plots reveal some
compelling insights. For instance, for none of the households is Food a luxury good.
However, while it is a necessary good for low-income households, Food seems to be an
inferior good for many high-income households. This finding could be explained by the
fact that high-income households have a higher propensity to derive their nutrients from
food services like restaurants or canteens, while lower-income households are more likely to
prepare food themselves. Thus, an income increase would induce low-income households
to demand more raw food, while high-income households would demand less food and
more of the commodity Restaurants. Indeed, Restaurants has a positive income elasticity
for all households, although it is a luxury good for low-income households and a necessary
good for high-income households. The commodity groups Clothing, Recreation and Others
are luxury goods, while Housing and Transport are necessary goods for all households.
Lastly, Alcohol is a necessary good for low-income households and a luxury good for
households with a high income.
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Figure 5.1: Income elasticities of consumers of alcohol.
Figure 5.2: Income elasticities of abstainers of alcohol.
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Figures 5.3 – 5.6 are similar to Figures 5.1 and 5.2, but plot own-price elasticities instead
of income elasticities, along with a quadratic fit. Since the plots depict only elasticities of
rational households (according to the model’s prediction), none of the observations has a
positive own-price elasticity, neither in the uncompensated nor in the compensated case.
It is interesting to note that for both consumers (Figures 5.3 and 5.4) and abstainers
(Figures 5.5 and 5.6), the relationship between the uncompensated elasticities and log
total expenditure of each group appears similar to the respective relationship in the
uncompensated case. The only exception is Recreation. For this group, there is no clear
relationship between uncompensated elasticities and the income of alcohol-consuming
households. However, if these households are financially compensated for the price change,
there is a clear positive linear relationship between the elasticities and log total expenditure.
This difference implies that higher-income households decrease their demand for Recreation
to a lesser extent than lower-income households. For abstaining households, there is a
negative predicted relationship between uncompensated own-price elasticities of Recreation.
Again, if these households are financially compensated, the relationship becomes positive.
This observed pattern most likely reflects that higher-income households spend a higher
fraction of their income on Recreation. Furthermore, income elasticities of Recreation
are generally high, making it a luxury good. Given that compensated elasticities are
calculated as "cij = "uij + wj"i, these observations could imply that the compensated
own-price elasticities of Recreation change more for higher-income households.
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Figure 5.3: Uncompensated own-price elasticities of consumers of alcohol.
Figure 5.4: Compensated own-price elasticities of consumers of alcohol.
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Figure 5.5: Uncompensated own-price elasticities of abstainers of alcohol.
Figure 5.6: Compensated own-price elasticities of abstainers of alcohol.
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5.5 Imposing Negativity
There has been some research on how negativity could be imposed when estimating the












From this, it can be inferred that the Slutsky matrix S is globally negative semidefinite
(negative definite if only n   1 goods are considered), if and only if both  ij = 0 for
i, j = (1, . . . , n) and  i = 0 for i = (1, . . . , n) (Moschini, 1998). Imposing these restrictions,
however, would lead to a constant share model, corresponding to the Cobb-Douglas case.
Such a restrictive model would in turn undermine the strengths of the AIDS model.
Moschini (1998) argued that negativity (or, equivalently, concavity of the expenditure
function) can be imposed locally at any arbitrary data point. He proposed to use
pi = m = 1 and suggested scaling the data such that pi and m correspond to 1 at sample
mean. At this point, the Slutsky substitution terms in equation (5.4) can be be written as
 ij =  ij + ↵i↵j    ij↵i (5.5)
where ↵i = wi if ↵0 = 0 is assumed. Consequently, in order for negativity to be satisfied
at this specific point, matrix  with elements  ij must be negative semidefinite. Moschini
(1998) proceeded by reparametrising  with the Cholesky decomposition. Diewert and
Wales (1987) showed that  can be written as  =  T0T where T is an upper triangular
matrix with elements ⌧ij.  T0T is then by construction a negative semidefinte matrix.
Subsequently, the AIDS budget share equations can be written and estimated in terms of
⌧ij, which satisfies negativity by construction at the point pi = m = 1 for pi = (1, . . . , n).
The drawback of this approach is that the resulting demand system is highly nonlinear in
the parameters (Moschini, 1998).
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6 Discussion
The main goal of this thesis was to learn about households’ demand responses to changes
in income and prices in Switzerland. The results presented in this thesis are, in general,
very plausible and seem to be in line with economic intuition. On average, the commodity
groups Food, Alcohol (for consumers of alcohol), Housing and Transport are necessities
while Clothing, Restaurants, Recreation and Others are luxury goods. Regarding price-
elasticities, I find that Food, Alcohol (for consumers of alcohol), Clothing, Restaurants,
Transport and Recreation are price-inelastic commodities. For abstainers of alcohol,
Housing is found to be price-inelastic as well. The remaining categories are all price-
elastic, both for consumers and abstainers of alcohol and both in the uncompensated
and compensated cases. I furthermore found that if the restrictions of homogeneity and
symmetry are not imposed, they should be rejected – a finding that contradicts the
standard consumer theory but is in line with the empirical finding of many other studies.13
Finally, checking the negative definiteness of the (modified) Slutsky matrix revealed that
only 31.2 % of the households in the sample satisfy the negativity condition.
The most interesting estimates from this thesis are arguably the uncompensated and
compensated own-price elasticities of demand for Alcohol, as well as the respective income
elasticity. I implemented an elaborate empirical strategy in order to get unbiased estimates
for the elasticities involving alcohol. Gallet (2007) conducted a meta-analysis of 132 studies
that studied the demand for alcohol. He found the median own-price elasticities to be
roughly -0.5. However, studies using AIDS models tend to have a higher estimate in
terms of magnitude (-0.8), whereas the median elasticity of studies implementing a hurdle
model is -0.6. Given those results, it seems surprising that I find an own-price elasticity of
demand for alcohol of approximately -0.2. This estimate is much lower in magnitude than
what could be expected by considering Gallet (2007)’s meta-analysis. Wagenaar et al.
(2009) found in their meta-analysis that the mean own-price elasticity of alcohol is -0.51.
Here again, my estimates seem to be of a different magnitude than this study suggests.
The own-price elasticity estimates of Alcohol found in this thesis refer to the intensive
margin, i.e. it gives an estimate for how much consumers adjust their demand to price
13There is, however, an example of a notable study that found opposite results and failed to reject
homogeneity (see Blundell et al., 1993).
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changes. However, there is also an extensive margin, that is, an effect of a price increase
on whether a given household is a consumer or an abstainer of alcohol. This extensive
margin is not captured by the elasticity estimate for Alcohol that I find in this thesis and
could be one of the reasons for the difference.
Aepli (2014b) is the only study examining alcohol consumption in Switzerland with a
QUAIDS model also correcting for sample selection. Unfortunately, he did not report the
overall own-price elasticity of demand for alcohol. Instead, he only presented elasticities
at a more disaggregated level for the commodities beer, wine, and spirits, ranging from -1
to -0.6. Aepli (2014b)’s results, however, can hardly be compared to the results found
in my thesis. The reason is that different types of alcohol are arguably close substitutes.
Thus, a price increase of one type of alcohol (e.g. wine) might induce people to replace
it with another type of alcohol (e.g. beer). Hence, the drop in demand for wine after a
price increase might be partially outweighed by an increase in demand for beer. These
substitution patterns within the commodity Alcohol are not captured in my model. Since
a broader definition of the commodity group should lead to a lower own-price elasticity
(due to the lack of close substitutes), my estimates are plausible.
Gallet (2007) also analysed income elasticities of demand across the studies examined.
He found the median income elasticity to be approximately 1 for the studies using AIDS
models, while studies employing a hurdle model have a median income elasticity of ca.
0.3. The estimated mean income elasticity of demand for alcohol found in this thesis
(approximately 0.8) is in line with the finding of Gallet (2007).
It would be interesting to compare the remaining own-price elasticities to the findings of
other meta-analyses. Unfortunately, most studies define commodity groups differently, and
it is challenging to find comparable results. There are, however, some commodity groups
that most studies have in common, namely Food, Clothing and sometimes Transport.
Still, meta-studies analysing price elasticities of demand for food usually investigate more
disaggregated food groups rather than the overall demand for food. Furthermore, there
seem to be no meta-analyses available for clothing, making it harder to put the results
from this thesis into perspective. Moreover, as mentioned earlier, it is hard to trust the
estimated elasticities involving Clothing, as I have not controlled for its relatively high
share of zero consumption, rendering comparisons pointless.
Despite the lack of meta-studies, it might be interesting to compare my results to some
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selected studies. Banks et al. (1997) found own-price elasticities for food equal to ca.
-0.8 (compensated) and -1 (uncompensated) and an income elasticity of approximately
0.6. The own-price elasticities are very similar to those presented here, whereas the
income elasticity of demand for food seems to be significantly lower in Switzerland yet not
implausible. In a more recent study using aggregate time-series data from Norway, Nygård
(2012) found the price elasticity of demand for food to be approximately between -0.8 and
-0.7 (depending on the model specification). Similarly, income elasticity was estimated to
be between 0.14 and 0.78. Another recent study from Norway found own-price and income
elasticities of demand for food of similar magnitudes (Gaarder, 2018). Here again, the
results from this thesis seem to be in line with those findings. Gaarder (2018) furthermore
defined a Transport category as done in this thesis and estimates price elasticities equal
to -1.1 (uncompensated) and -0.8 (compensated), as well as an income elasticity of 1.2.
All these estimates are slightly lower in this thesis, making Transport more price-inelastic
in Switzerland, as well as a necessity rather than a luxury good.
It seems that the results, in general, are very plausible, despite some minor deviations from
findings from comparable studies. Many of these deviations can be intuitively explained.
For instance, on average, Switzerland might have a lower price elasticity of demand
for alcoholic beverages due to its higher income level relative to most other countries.
Moreover, Swiss households allocate only a small share of their budget to Alcohol in
international comparisons (Aepli, 2014b), which could also be a reason for the lower
elasticity estimate.
The difference between Switzerland and Norway regarding Transport could be attributed
to geographical differences. As Switzerland is a small country, it is simple and convenient
to live in one city and work elsewhere. Indeed, as BFS (2021) wrote, “In 2019, some eight
out of ten employed persons in Switzerland were commuters, [...]”, which seems quite high.
Hence, the relatively low price elasticity of demand for Transport could be explained by
this observation and its classification as a necessary good.
6.1 Limitations
The primary source of scepticism for the results of this thesis is arguably the large
fraction of households that appear to violate the negativity restriction. I implemented
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many specifications of the QUAIDS model to find the possible cause of this surprising
and puzzling finding. The main attempts include: Estimating the QUAIDS on a more
homogeneous sub-sample of the data, using national price index data instead of Stone-
Lewbel prices, changing the control variables in the budget share equations, not controlling
for expenditure endogeneity, not controlling for sample selection (dropping the IMR as a
control variable), and many more. Despite this large number of attempts and different
approaches, the issue has persisted. Therefore, the cause of this finding can only be
speculated upon.
It seems unlikely that this result reflects the actual consumption behavior of households.
Therefore, I discuss several shortcomings and problems in the analysis that could potentially
question the results in general, but in particular, the strong rejection of negativity.
1. Stone-Lewbel prices: Price data was calculated using equation (3.4). The problem
with this procedure is that for many sub-categories, households do not report any
expenditure. Consequently, the respective sub-category budget share is equal to zero.
Therefore, it is impossible to calculate Stone-Lewbel prices for a household reporting zero
consumption on any sub-category as the sub-category budget share enters the denominator
of the formula. In my approach, I overcame this problem by assigning such households
the mean Stone-Lewbel price of all other households for the given commodity. Doing
so, however, might be a bad approximation of the actual prices faced by households and
could potentially give undesired estimation results, which might explain the empirical
deviation from demand theory. I mitigated this problem by defining the sub-categories as
broad as possible to minimise the number of households reporting zero expenditure on the
sub-categories. Despite this effort, the significantly positive estimate for Dummy mean
price in Table A1.7 indicates that households facing a mean Stone-Lewbel price are more
likely to violate negativity. This evidence suggests that I did not succeed in counteracting
this problem.
Another solution could be to impute prices. This approach estimates the missing sub-
expenditure share for each households reporting zero expenditure on a sub-category. Given
the estimated values, one can easily calculate Stone-Lewbel prices even for the households
without any expenditure on the sub-categories. One implementation of this approach can
be found in Menon et al. (2017).
52 6.1 Limitations
2. Selection model: There are several issues regarding the selection model. Firstly, the
validity of the identifying independent variable Tobacco might be questionable. Although
it seems plausible that a smoking household is indeed more likely to be a consumer of
alcohol, it could, of course, also be the other way around. If a household is a consumer of
alcohol, it is also more likely to smoke. Pryce (2016) suggested using a religion variable
instead of a Tobacco indicator to identify abstaining households. However, given the
unavailability of such information, he proposed the use of an interaction term between
a dummy variable for zero gambling expenditure and a dummy for zero expenditure on
pork. He argued that this would successfully identify Muslim households, as gambling
and pork consumption are forbidden in Islam. Unfortunately, this turns out to be a bad
approximation in my analysis. 10.6 % of the households do not report expenditure on
gambling or pork. Since only 5.1 % of the Swiss population are Muslims (BFS, 2018),
this seems to identify Muslim households poorly. Indeed, running the probit regression as
done in Section 5.1, including this interaction term, gives an estimated coefficient that is
highly insignificant (p-value = 0.763). Hence, I decided to drop this variable from the
selection equation.
Secondly, I followed García-Enríquez and Echevarría (2016)’s approach and used national
price indices as price data in the probit model. It is debatable whether this is a good
approximation of the actual prices faced by households. Replacing national price indices by
Stone-Lewbel prices gives highly implausible results in the subsequent QUAIDS estimation,
which could be due to collinearity between the IMR and the regressors of the QUAIDS
model (see Section 5.1). Therefore, I decided to stick to García-Enríquez and Echevarría
(2016)’s specification. Still, it would be interesting to see if the results turned out better
when imputed Stone-Lewbel prices are used as suggested in the previous bullet point.
Lastly, I adopted a single-hurdle model to correct for sample selection. According to this
model, households decide whether to be a consumer of alcohol following a selection process.
Hence, zero consumption because of a corner solution resulting from utility maximisation
is not allowed. Not allowing for corner solutions is highly restrictive and does not have
to be true. A more realistic approach would be to assume a double-hurdle model, which
allows for corner solutions. This model, however, has only been developed for single
equations and can thus not be used for demand systems as applied in this thesis.
3. IV regression: As briefly discussed in Section 5.2, it is unclear whether the instrument
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used is valid. The main problem is that Log disposable income is in itself a decision
variable of households. If the consequence of this were that income (the instrument) and
the error terms of the budget share equations are correlated, the effect of total expenditure
on the budget shares would be wrongly determined. This concern could be counteracted
by using better instrument variables that are truly exogenous, which seems difficult given
the limited amount of variables in the data set.
4. Omitted variable bias: Obviously, a possible shortcoming of the empirical strategy
of this thesis could be an omitted variable bias in the budget share equations. One might
think of many factors influencing a households’ choices of how to allocate their budgets
that are also correlated with other right-hand side variables. A self-evident candidate
could be a household’s wealth. Although wealth arguably mostly affects the consumption
decision regarding durable goods, it could also influence a household’s budget allocation
to non-durable goods. This argument is especially true for a household consisting of
pensioners who decided to take the lump-sum withdrawals from their pension funds instead
of monthly payments. Given that 55 % of all newly retired individuals in 2015 chose
to withdraw their pension funds (BFS, 2017), not controlling for wealth could lead to
problems in the analysis. Consider Food, for instance: Similar to the argument presented
in Section 5.4, it could be the case that wealthier households spend a higher fraction of
their budget on Restaurants and less on Food than less wealthy households. This would
imply that wealth is a determinant of the budget share variables of Restaurants and Food.
If wealth is also correlated with one or more explanatory variables such as the number
of pensioners, for instance, the fundamental zero conditional mean assumption would be
violated.
5. Standard errors: The problem regarding standard errors can be traced back to the
selection model. I “manually” computed the IMR for all households and included the IMR
as an additional regressor in the QUAIDS model. However, the IMR itself is estimated
with some uncertainty. Thus, treating the IMR as a regular dependent variable does not
account for the estimation error of the IMR and therefore under-reports standard errors
of the QUAIDS model. Heckman (1979) showed how correct asymptotic standard errors
can be calculated in a two-stage approach. Unfortunately, the option to do this has not
been implemented in the Stata command aidsills by Lecocq and Robin (2015). This
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problem could be fixed by establishing a self-written program to estimate the QUAIDS
that calculates correct standard errors by accounting for the imprecisely estimated IMR.
Another possible solution could be bootstrapping of standard errors. The former approach
would involve extensive coding, which in itself is error-prone and therefore not desirable.
Bootstrapping appears to be a more attractive solution. However, to achieve bootstrapped
standard errors that are estimated precisely enough, one would have to replicate the
selection model and the QUAIDS many times. Efron and Tibshirani (1993, p. 52) stated
that “very seldom are more than B = 200 replications needed for estimating a standard
error”, while Cameron and Trivedi (2009, p. 419) suggested computing 400 replications.
Given this high number of replications required, paired with the large sample and the
iterative nature of the estimator, this solution seems impractical. The computational
effort entailed by this would arguably exceed its benefits.
Another source of errors could be collinearity between the IMR and the explanatory
variables in the QUAIDS, which again could lead to wrongly estimated standard errors
(Cameron and Trivedi, 2009, p. 546). This issue, however, is especially likely to occur if
the same set of regressors are used in the selection equation and the outcome equation(s).
To mitigate this concern, I added the variable Tobacco to the selection model, which I
assume to be excluded from the outcome model.
Wrongly estimated standard errors can have implications for the inference of the results.
Firstly, and most apparently, the estimated elasticities have too low standard errors. This
follows from the fact that they are directly computed with the estimated coefficients of
the QUAIDS, which have too low standard errors. Consequently, one could interpret
elasticities to be significantly positive or negative, while they are, in fact, not. Secondly,
as briefly mentioned in Section 5.4, the  2-statistics of the homogeneity and symmetry
tests are too high. Hence, it could be the case that one falsely rejects the restrictions
(committing a type I/↵ error).
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7 Conclusion
This thesis was devoted to analysing consumer demand in Switzerland employing an
empirical strategy that has not yet been implemented with Swiss data. The main goal was
to estimate own-price, cross-price and income elasticities of demand for eight commodity
groups. Such estimates can be used as a foundation for welfare analyses or an evaluation
of the indirect tax system and serve as a basis for optimal decisions of policymakers. In
addition to estimating elasticities, the empirical validity of the adding-up, homogeneity,
symmetry and negativity restrictions postulated from demand theory has been tested and
discussed.
For the analysis, I used household expenditure data collected through the Swiss Household
Budget Survey from 2006-2017. Publicly available price index data was retrieved, and
custom-defined price indices have been calculated for the eight commodity groups. Next, I
introduced cross-sectional variation by calculating household-specific Stone-Lewbel prices.
Finally, I estimated a QUAIDS model with that data, controlling for the numerous
observations reporting zero expenditure on alcohol with a two-step selection model. The
selection model resembles the one originally developed by Heckman (1979) and adapted
in the context of demand systems by Heien and Wessells (1990). In the first step, I
estimated a probit model and calculated the IMR for all households. The IMR, which
is calculated differently for consumers and abstainers of alcohol, was then added as an
additional regressor to the QUAIDS models. Thus, I had to estimate two separate demand
systems for the two types of households, each of which including the appropriate IMR.
Lastly, I controlled for expenditure endogeneity with an augmented regression approach,
allowing testing for endogeneity of the expenditure variable. The non-linear QUAIDS
was estimated with an iterated linear least squares estimator developed by Blundell and
Robin (1999) until numerical convergence was reached. Given the estimated parameters
of the demand system, I calculated sample means of the own-price, cross-price (both
uncompensated and compensated) and income elasticities at the household level for the
two household types.
For consumers of alcohol, own-price elasticities of demand range from approximately -0.2
(Alcohol) to -1.3 (Others) in the uncompensated case and from -0.1 (Restaurants) to
56
-1.1 (Others) in the compensated case. For the same household types, income elasticities
are between 0.3 (Food) and 1.6 (Recreation). For abstainers of alcohol, uncompensated
own-price elasticities of demand are in the interval -0.3 (Restaurants) and -1.2 (Others)
while uncompensated own-price elasticities are between -0.1 (Restaurants) and -1 (Others).
The income elasticities range from 0.3 for Food to 1.7 for Recreation. The estimated
elasticities seem plausible and are roughly in line with findings from comparable studies.
When testing the restrictions derived from demand theory, both homogeneity and symmetry
are rejected, while adding-up is satisfied by construction. Many previous studies have
confirmed this result. Negativity, however, can neither be tested nor imposed but only
checked after estimation. Only approximately one-third of all households seem to satisfy
this restriction, which is both surprising and puzzling. However, the elasticities for the
whole sample and the households that satisfy negativity are virtually the same.
Future studies could build on this thesis and investigate one or more commodity groups
in more detail. It would, for instance, be interesting to reproduce Aepli (2014b)’s study
but replacing unit values, which he used, with Stone-Lewbel prices. Moreover, one could
investigate the Transport category at a more disaggregated level. This approach would
potentially allow predicting the effect of the CO2 Act, which the Swiss population will
vote on in Summer 2021. Another possible extension of this thesis, which would probably
be more interesting from a theoretical perspective, is to locally impose negativity at the
sample mean, as discussed in Section 5.5. By doing so, the effect of imposing negativity
on the estimated elasticities could be determined, and one would be able to learn more
about the practical relevance of this condition.
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Table A1.1: Composition of the commodity groups.
Sub-categories
Level 1 Level 2
Food and non-alcoholic beverages
(Food)
Food Bread and grain products; Meat; Fish; Dairy products and eggs;
Fats and oils; Fruits; Vegetables; Sweets; Other food
Non-alcoholic beverages Coffee, tea and cacao; Mineral waters and juices





Clothing Clothing fabrics and accessories; Men’s clothing;
Women’s clothing; Children’s clothing; Sportswear;
Dry-cleaning and repairs
Footwear Men’s footwear; Women’s footwear; Children’s footwear;
Shoe repairs
Housing and energy Housing Household maintenance; Household insurance
(Housing) Energy Energy main residence; Energy secondary residence
Restaurants and accommodation
(Restaurants)
Restaurants Restaurants, Cafés and bars;
Self-service restaurants and take-aways; Canteens;
Private invitations




Transport Fuel; Maintenance of vehicles; Other vehicle services;
Transport services; Car insurance
Communication Postal services; Telecommunication services
Recreation and leisure
(Recreation)
Recreation Medical products; Storage devices and contents;
Games, toys and hobbies; Spots and camping;
Plants and garden; Pets and veterinary services
Leisure Recreational and cultural services; Books and brochures;
Newspapers and periodicals; Other printed matters;
Package holiday
Other goods and services Other goods Education; Personal care; Personal effects
(Others) Other services Health services; Social protection services; Financial services;
Private health insurance; Other services
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Table A1.2: QUAIDS estimates for consumers of alcohol.
Budget shares
Food Alcohol Clothing Housing Restaurants Transport Recreation Others
Log price parameters  ij
Food 0.037*** 0.001 -0.012*** 0.006** -0.014*** 0.008 -0.022*** -0.004
(0.004) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
Alcohol 0.001 0.022*** -0.006*** -0.002 -0.006** 0.000 -0.003 -0.006**
(0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Clothing -0.012*** -0.006*** 0.043*** -0.009*** -0.010*** -0.015*** -0.003 0.013***
(0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.002)
Housing 0.006 -0.002 -0.009*** -0.010*** -0.013*** 0.018*** 0.009* 0.001
(0.004) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
Restaurants -0.014*** -0.006*** -0.010*** -0.013*** 0.111*** -0.018*** -0.044*** -0.004
(0.003) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Transport 0.008* 0.000 -0.015*** 0.018*** -0.018*** 0.045*** -0.027*** -0.011**
(0.003) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.003)
Recreation -0.022*** -0.003* -0.003 0.009*** -0.044*** -0.027*** 0.048*** 0.042***
(0.004) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
Others -0.004 -0.006*** 0.013*** 0.001 -0.004 -0.011** 0.042*** -0.031***
(0.003) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Income parameter  i
Log total expenditure -0.141*** 0.013** 0.002 0.002 -0.066*** -0.006 0.143*** 0.051***
(0.008) (0.004) (0.006) (0.005) (0.009) (0.010) (0.009) (0.010)
Quadratic income parameter  i
Log total expenditure squared -0.002 0.004*** -0.007*** 0.006*** -0.022*** 0.010*** 0.011*** 0.000
(0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Residual parameter ⇢i
Expenditure residual first stage 0.044*** 0.007*** -0.015*** -0.001 -0.020*** 0.004 -0.035*** 0.016**
(0.004) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
Socio-demographic parameters ⇠i
Woman reference person -0.009*** -0.002** 0.012*** -0.003*** -0.015*** -0.010*** 0.005** 0.022***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Number of children 0.025*** -0.002*** 0.001* 0.003*** -0.016*** -0.011*** -0.004*** 0.004***
(0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Number of adults 0.046*** -0.005*** -0.004*** 0.006*** -0.028*** -0.009*** -0.010*** 0.004**
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Number of pensioners 0.060*** -0.006*** -0.008*** 0.015*** -0.047*** -0.040*** 0.000 0.026***
(0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Number of earners -0.008*** -0.001* 0.001 -0.004*** 0.013*** 0.018*** -0.007*** -0.012***
(0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
IMR parameter  ⌫uci
Inverse Mills ratio -0.009 -0.039*** 0.025*** -0.009 -0.030** -0.084*** 0.103*** 0.043***
(0.009) (0.004) (0.006) (0.005) (0.010) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011)
N 20’194 20’194 20’194 20’194 20’194 20’194 20’194 20’194
R
2 0.301 0.074 0.119 0.129 0.218 0.134 0.108 0.127
Yearly dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Regional dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Note: Number of iterations until numerical convergence occurred: 7 (tolerance level: 1⇥ 10 5).
Standard errors in parentheses. * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001.
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Table A1.3: QUAIDS estimates for abstainers of alcohol.
Budget shares
Food Clothing Housing Restaurants Transport Recreation Others
Log price parameters  ij
Food 0.050*** -0.012*** 0.006** -0.017*** 0.000 -0.029*** 0.002
(0.005) (0.003) (0.002) (0.004) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
Clothing -0.012*** 0.040*** -0.011*** -0.009** -0.019*** -0.001 0.012***
(0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004) (0.003)
Housing 0.006 -0.011*** 0.007** -0.017*** 0.016** -0.001 0.000
(0.005) (0.003) (0.003) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
Restaurants -0.017*** -0.009*** -0.017*** 0.110*** -0.022*** -0.045*** 0.000
(0.004) (0.002) (0.002) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
Transport 0.000 -0.019*** 0.016*** -0.022*** 0.085*** -0.040*** -0.020***
(0.004) (0.002) (0.002) (0.004) (0.005) (0.005) (0.004)
Recreation -0.029*** -0.001 -0.001 -0.045*** -0.040*** 0.090*** 0.027***
(0.004) (0.002) (0.002) (0.004) (0.005) (0.006) (0.004)
Others 0.002 0.012*** 0.000 0.000 -0.020*** 0.027*** -0.021***
(0.004) (0.002) (0.002) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
Income parameter  i
Log total expenditure -0.133*** -0.007 0.010 -0.055*** -0.026* 0.169*** 0.042***
(0.010) (0.007) (0.006) (0.011) (0.013) (0.011) (0.011)
Quadratic income parameter  i
Log total expenditure squared 0.000 -0.009*** 0.008*** -0.021*** 0.008*** 0.013*** 0.000
(0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Residual parameter ⇢i
Expenditure residual first stage 0.051*** -0.017*** 0.001 -0.031*** 0.024*** -0.058*** 0.030***
(0.005) (0.004) (0.003) (0.006) (0.007) (0.006) (0.006)
Socio-demographic parameters ⇠i
Woman reference person -0.003 0.013*** 0.001 -0.032*** -0.016*** 0.006** 0.031***
(0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002)
Number of children 0.029*** 0.001 0.004*** -0.021*** -0.009*** -0.010*** 0.006***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Number of adults 0.049*** -0.004*** 0.010*** -0.035*** -0.011*** -0.013*** 0.004*
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Number of pensioners 0.069*** -0.009*** 0.024*** -0.058*** -0.056*** -0.002 0.031***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Number of earners -0.008*** -0.002 -0.004*** 0.013*** 0.019*** -0.009*** -0.010***
(0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
IMR parameter  ⌫uai
Inverse Mills ratio -0.024* 0.015* -0.005 -0.021 -0.086*** 0.099*** 0.022
(0.011) (0.008) (0.007) (0.012) (0.014) (0.012) (0.013)
N 14’101 14’101 14’101 14’101 14’101 14’101 14’101
R
2 0.286 0.106 0.144 0.212 0.145 0.111 0.127
Yearly dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Regional dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Note: Number of iterations until numerical convergence occurred: 7 (tolerance level: 1⇥ 10 5).
Standard errors in parentheses. * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001.
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Table A1.4: Predicted budget shares ( bwi), observed budget shares (wi) and income
elasticities (✏i) for consumers and abstainers of alcohol (sample averages for households
satisfying Slutsky negativity).
Consumers Abstainers
bwi wi ✏i bwi wi ✏i
Food 0.148*** 0.156 0.102** 0.143*** 0.152 0.061
(0.001) – (0.032) (0.001) – (0.043)
Alcohol 0.032*** 0.033 0.837***
(0.001) – (0.062)
Clothing 0.068*** 0.065 1.451*** 0.069*** 0.065 1.471***
(0.001) – (0.037) (0.001) – (0.046)
Housing 0.056*** 0.057 0.604*** 0.058*** 0.061 0.545***
(0.001) – (0.044) (0.001) – (0.056)
Restaurants 0.172*** 0.164 1.146*** 0.179*** 0.172 1.208***
(0.001) – (0.024) (0.001) – (0.030)
Transport 0.211*** 0.219 0.785*** 0.230*** 0.233 0.731***
(0.001) – (0.025) (0.002) – (0.030)
Recreation 0.165*** 0.161 1.597*** 0.169*** 0.162 1.661***
(0.001) – (0.025) (0.001) – (0.030)
Others 0.149*** 0.144 1.340*** 0.152*** 0.155 1.269***
(0.001) – (0.030) (0.002) – (0.036)
Note: Standard errors in parentheses. * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001.
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Table A1.5: Uncompensated and compensated price elasticities of demand for consumers
of alcohol (sample averages for households satisfying Slutsky negativity).
Food Alcohol Clothing Housing Restaurants Transport Recreation Others
Uncompensated
Food -0.869*** 0.044*** 0.010 0.075** 0.017 0.197*** 0.226*** 0.199***
(0.022) (0.012) (0.014) (0.025) (0.017) (0.020) (0.021) (0.018)
Alcohol 0.095 -0.318*** -0.181*** -0.056 -0.124*** 0.018 -0.110* -0.162***
(0.049) (0.027) (0.032) (0.054) (0.037) (0.044) (0.046) (0.040)
Clothing -0.177*** -0.105*** -0.411*** -0.152*** -0.238*** -0.297*** -0.171*** 0.100***
(0.033) (0.018) (0.022) (0.036) (0.024) (0.028) (0.030) (0.027)
Housing 0.123*** -0.025 -0.128*** -1.158*** -0.160*** 0.394*** 0.252*** 0.098***
(0.034) (0.018) (0.022) (0.037) (0.026) (0.032) (0.033) (0.028)
Restaurants -0.140*** -0.033** -0.074*** -0.082*** -0.408*** -0.134*** -0.242*** -0.035*
(0.021) (0.011) (0.013) (0.023) (0.018) (0.018) (0.019) (0.017)
Transport 0.037 0.004 -0.051*** 0.094*** -0.047** -0.749*** -0.067*** -0.007
(0.019) (0.010) (0.012) (0.021) (0.015) (0.018) (0.018) (0.016)
Recreation -0.019 -0.046*** -0.081*** 0.030 -0.328*** -0.257*** -0.988*** 0.091***
(0.023) (0.012) (0.015) (0.025) (0.017) (0.020) (0.021) (0.018)
Others 0.014 -0.051*** 0.053** -0.004 -0.073*** -0.127*** 0.144*** -1.295***
(0.026) (0.014) (0.017) (0.028) (0.020) (0.023) (0.025) (0.020)
Compensated
Food -0.854*** 0.048*** 0.017 0.080** 0.034* 0.218*** 0.243*** 0.214***
(0.024) (0.012) (0.014) (0.025) (0.015) (0.018) (0.019) (0.017)
Alcohol 0.219*** -0.291*** -0.124*** -0.009 0.020 0.194*** 0.029 -0.038
(0.052) (0.026) (0.032) (0.055) (0.032) (0.041) (0.042) (0.039)
Clothing 0.037 -0.058** -0.312*** -0.071* 0.011 0.009 0.069* 0.316***
(0.035) (0.018) (0.021) (0.036) (0.021) (0.027) (0.028) (0.026)
Housing 0.212*** -0.005 -0.087*** -1.125*** -0.056* 0.521*** 0.352*** 0.188***
(0.036) (0.018) (0.022) (0.038) (0.022) (0.029) (0.030) (0.027)
Restaurants 0.030 0.004 0.004 -0.018 -0.211*** 0.108*** -0.052** 0.136***
(0.022) (0.011) (0.013) (0.023) (0.015) (0.017) (0.018) (0.016)
Transport 0.153*** 0.030** 0.003 0.138*** 0.088*** -0.584*** 0.063*** 0.110***
(0.020) (0.010) (0.012) (0.021) (0.013) (0.016) (0.017) (0.015)
Recreation 0.217*** 0.006 0.028 0.119*** -0.054*** 0.080*** -0.724*** 0.329***
(0.024) (0.012) (0.014) (0.025) (0.015) (0.019) (0.019) (0.018)
Others 0.212*** -0.008 0.145*** 0.070* 0.157*** 0.155*** 0.365*** -1.096***
(0.027) (0.014) (0.016) (0.028) (0.017) (0.021) (0.023) (0.020)
Note: Standard errors in parentheses. * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001.
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Table A1.6: Uncompensated and compensated price elasticities of demand for abstainers
of alcohol (sample averages for households satisfying Slutsky negativity).
Food Clothing Housing Restaurants Transport Recreation Others
Uncompensated
Food -0.788*** 0.006 0.083** 0.029 0.128*** 0.239*** 0.241***
(0.028) (0.021) (0.030) (0.025) (0.026) (0.027) (0.024)
Clothing -0.188*** -0.476*** -0.171*** -0.233*** -0.354*** -0.133*** 0.084*
(0.039) (0.029) (0.041) (0.033) (0.034) (0.035) (0.033)
Housing 0.135*** -0.140*** -0.866*** -0.183*** 0.347*** 0.081* 0.080*
(0.040) (0.029) (0.043) (0.035) (0.038) (0.038) (0.034)
Restaurants -0.141*** -0.072*** -0.098*** -0.451*** -0.164*** -0.256*** -0.026
(0.024) (0.017) (0.026) (0.023) (0.022) (0.021) (0.020)
Transport -0.016 -0.056*** 0.077** -0.042* -0.589*** -0.077*** -0.027
(0.022) (0.016) (0.024) (0.019) (0.022) (0.020) (0.019)
Recreation -0.026 -0.068*** -0.037 -0.352*** -0.319*** -0.841*** -0.018
(0.026) (0.019) (0.028) (0.022) (0.023) (0.024) (0.022)
Others 0.054 0.053* -0.012 -0.042 -0.165*** 0.047 -1.204***
(0.030) (0.021) (0.032) (0.026) (0.027) (0.028) (0.024)
Compensated
Food -0.780*** 0.011 0.087** 0.040 0.142*** 0.250*** 0.251***
(0.030) (0.021) (0.031) (0.022) (0.024) (0.024) (0.023)
Clothing 0.022 -0.374*** -0.086* 0.030 -0.016 0.115*** 0.308***
(0.042) (0.028) (0.042) (0.029) (0.033) (0.032) (0.031)
Housing 0.213*** -0.102*** -0.834*** -0.085** 0.472*** 0.173*** 0.163***
(0.043) (0.029) (0.043) (0.030) (0.034) (0.034) (0.032)
Restaurants 0.032 0.012 -0.028 -0.235*** 0.114*** -0.052** 0.158***
(0.026) (0.017) (0.026) (0.019) (0.020) (0.020) (0.019)
Transport 0.088*** -0.005 0.120*** 0.089*** -0.422*** 0.046* 0.084***
(0.024) (0.016) (0.024) (0.017) (0.019) (0.018) (0.018)
Recreation 0.211*** 0.047* 0.060* -0.055** 0.063** -0.561*** 0.235***
(0.028) (0.019) (0.028) (0.020) (0.022) (0.022) (0.021)
Others 0.235*** 0.141*** 0.062* 0.185*** 0.126*** 0.261*** -1.011***
(0.032) (0.021) (0.032) (0.022) (0.025) (0.025) (0.023)
Note: Standard errors in parentheses. * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001.
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Table A1.7: Determinants of violation of Slutsky negativity.
Dummy negativity
Woman reference person 0.186⇤⇤⇤
(0.019)
Number of children 0.403⇤⇤⇤
(0.011)
Number of adults 0.668⇤⇤⇤
(0.016)
Number of pensioners 1.125⇤⇤⇤
(0.022)
Number of earners -0.143⇤⇤⇤
(0.016)




Dummy mean price 0.251⇤⇤⇤
(0.021)
N 34’295
Note: Standard errors in parentheses.
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001.
